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Have a question? Send it in! Questions are answered by Rabbi Bartfeld.
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#256 Deriving benefit from non-kosher animals
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Q. I bought a pair of gloves and realized that they are made of pigskin with an acrylic lining.
Can I wear these even though I will be deriving pleasure from a pig? Is this the same as snake skin or alligator shoes or purses?
A. There is no prohibition on deriving benefit from non-kosher animals. It is also permitted to wear them during food preparation.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as advised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 2/19/2013 1:44 PM |
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#255 Studying the works of Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook zt"l
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Q. I was told by someone that it is forbidden to study the works of Rabbi Avraham Yitzchak HaKohen Kook zt"l. Is this true or is it permitted? And if it is forbidden to study them in general, may one at least look up the quotes in these works attributed to him in the works of halachic decisors, such as Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l?
A. Although some of the opinions of Horav Avrohom Yitzchok HaKohen Kook Zt"l in regards to the interpretation of Geula and the status of the Land of Israel are seen as controversial to those maintained by mainstream Gedoilim of the last and today's generation, there is no disagreement as to the greatness of his Torah erudition and piety. He was backed by Horav Shmuel Salant ZT"l, (Ohr Shlomo p.7), endorsed by Horav I.Z. Meltzer Zt"l (Oz Nid'bru 4, p. 26) and his close relationship with Horav S.Z. Auerbach and his father Horav Chaim Yehuda Leib Zt"l is well known and amply described in Ohr Shlomo (p.10). As a Posek he is widely quoted in contemporary responsa, from Minchas Shlomo (4, p.162) and Tzitz Eliezer (7,48 – 8,31 – 10,41) to Nishmas Avrohom (4,14) et.al.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit'a opinion is that (Chas Vesholom) there is no prohibition on studying the works or quoting Horav Avrohom Yitzchok HaKohen Kook Zt"l.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 2/5/2013 11:42 PM |
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#254 Using the term Alav Hashalom in a situation where it probably may not be true
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Q. I once heard from Rav Shlomo Miller shlit"a that one may not append the term a"h to the name of the deceased if the deceased was not observant, because a"h means that the Divine Presence hovers over the grave of such a person and it would not do so over a non-observant person.
What alternative abbreviation, if any, may be used, in English and in Hebrew, especially if one wishes to avoid unpleasant confrontation?
A. Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a opinion is that if the deceased indeed qualifies as non-observant by conviction and belief and not only by accident such as a "tinok shenisba" (a "captured child" who was denied proper Torah education), the term "Tehey menuchoso b'shalom" which is more a plea and a blessing would be appropriate. The expression "alav hashalom" as you mention, is a statement connoting that Shechina hovers over him, which probably may not be true.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a.
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Posted 2/5/2013 11:38 PM |
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#253 Understanding the 'removal of life support' and the 'Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order' contradiction
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Q. I have heard that in Judaism (especially Orthodox), a power of attorney for health of a loved one is allowed to deny resuscitation to a sick person if they think they are not going to make it, however Jewish law does not allow them to unhook life support systems once they are in place, even if the person is functionally dead or there is little hope.
This makes zero sense to me -- the denial of resuscitation is like murder, as I have witnessed people revived and living many more years. I think the Jewish laws are backwards. I would feel much more guilty for "guessing" that a person has no chance and denying resuscitation, than I would pulling out life support on someone whose organs no longer function and who is functionally dead. Your comments would be appreciated. Many thanks! (By the way, not sure if Reform rabbis have a different slant on the Orthodox perspective.)
A. A fundamental mitzvah of the Torah is saving and preserving life. Anyone who is able to save another person’s life but fails to do so infringes the law of "You are not to stand (idly) by the blood of your fellow. (Lev.19:16).". Most of the commandments of the Torah such as Sabbath may therefore be overridden to extend the life even of a person who is dying and has no chance of living more than a short period.( Yuma 83a-85b). Although Halacha categorically emphasizes the preservation of life and prohibits Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders, there may be a few exceptions.
When someone is dying and is on the very final stage of life (namely a goses, who by definition will not usually survive more than 72 hours) but external causes, such as a loud noise or grains of salt on his tongue, impede his death, the noise may be silenced or the grains of salt carefully removed, although we know that after removing the impediment he will die within a shorter time. (Remo, Yoreh Deah, 339:1).
The Talmud (Avoda Zarah 17b) relates how Rabbi Chaninah Ben Teradyon was sentenced to be burned alive wrapped in a Torah scroll, while wet wool was placed on his chest to prolong the agonies of death. As he was slowly dying in terrible pain his disciples pleaded: "Open then thy mouth, that the fire may enter and the sooner put an end to thy sufferings," The Rabbi replied, "It is best that He who hath given the soul should also take it away: he (the Rabbi) should not hasten his own death." However Rabbi Chaninah did not impede the executioner from removing the wool and thus precipitating his death.
These are but two general examples on a complicated halacha.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a opinion is that no DNR order should be given before the case is analyzed and reexamined by competent halachic authorities.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 2/5/2013 11:03 PM |
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#252 Extending the life of an unconscious person.
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Q. My mother was terminally ill, it was a matter of time according to the doctors. …
We were also told that every effort should be made to extend the life of a person, since even a short lapse of time is enough for a person to do teshuvah, does that apply to someone who is unconscious or suffers from dementia and is suffering?
A. Maintaining the life of a person is not necessarily a function of the individual's capacity or ability to do teshuva. Our Torah teaches us that life is a gift and it is not our prerogative to terminate it at will (Avos 4, 22), regardless of whether someone is unconscious or suffers from dementia.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 1/25/2013 2:06 PM |
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#251 Touching a Gosos
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Q. My mother was terminally ill, it was a matter of time according to the doctors. When she became unconscious and the attending nurse said that she would not last long, we were in doubt if we could even touch her, caress her, let the nurse change her soiled clothes or make her more comfortable as we were told by very religious relatives that you are not allowed to touch the dying, it seemed very cruel, were they correct?
A. Halacha dictates that a person close to death may enter into a state named goses. Most gosesim die within 72 hours.
Shulchan Oruch (Y.D. 339,1) rules that a goses is as alive as any other person. Thus, the prohibition and punishment for killing a goses is the same. (See; Minchas Chinuch 34). It is generally forbidden to move a goses, because, in light of his condition, such changes of posture or position may hasten his demise. (Y. D. 339,1). Shach (ibid.) quotes Maseches Smochos (1:4 - Shabbos 151b); "The goses is likened to a candle whose flame is about to be extinguished. If one touches it, it blows out. Nonetheless in Nekudas Hakesef he permits light touching.
Drisha (ibid. 1) discusses touching at length, Igrois Moishe C.M. 2, 73, 2) seems more stringent. (See Toras Harefuah p.70) however, Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a permits light touching, caressing and even light moving such as adjusting the angle of the bed when deemed necessary for the well-being of the patient, but not changing soiled clothes as that involve mayor bodily movement.
Many Poskim permit live-saving treatment for a goses when done by the attending physicians or medical personnel, (Teshuvos Vehanhogos 1, 872 – Tzitz Eliezer 8, 15 et. al.)
Remoh (ibid.) adds, that one may remove "anything that prevents the departure of the soul, such as a clanging noise such as the sound of a nearby woodchopper or a grain of salt that is on his tongue . . . since such acts do not accelerate death but merely remove an impediment to death".
The Remoh (E. H. 121, 7 and H. M 211,) identifies the symptoms of gesisah as the bringing up of secretions of the throat, caused by chest and breathing difficulties and strain. Some maintain that the term goses refers to the sounds of heavy respiration at that time (Oruch ).
There is a debate between contemporary Poiskim as to whether these symptoms are essential for the state of goses to begin or just the closeness to death creates it. (Igrois Moishe ibid - Treatment of the Terminally Ill, Tradition 30:3 (1996) p. 63)
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 1/25/2013 2:04 PM |
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#250 Home care vrs. hospitol care for a terminally ill person.
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Q. My mother was terminally ill, it was a matter of time according to the doctors. The siblings decided to bring her home and to let her depart in her familiar surroundings, even at the cost of not having the better care in the hospital that could have prolonged her days, was that correct according to the Halacha?
A) This type of question is complex, as there are many factors involved. A competent rabbinic authority that is privy to all the facts should make the decisions. He should also be provided with the medical contacts if he requires additional information.
On a similar question in this forum (129), we wrote Biur Halocho (328,4) states that we permit a Shabbos prohibited act, when there is a chance that it may extend the life of the dangerously ill, even when that act is not directly a cure for his sickness, but only serves to settle his mind, such as turning on or off lights, traveling with him etc. The Talmud Yerushalmi (Klaim 9,3) records a story about the sage Ullah being distressed to tears at the prospect of expiring outside of Eretz Yisroel. In Shmuel (II 19,38) we are told that King David agreed to his elderly and faithful servant Barzilay Hagilady's request to depart this life in his own hometown, rather than follow him in honour to Yerushalaim. The great relevance of the site of ones demise is echoed in the words of Ruth (1,17) to Neomi "Where you die, I will die".
As there is a reasonable expectation that in going home the patient's mind will settle, and that will cause his life to be extended. Being that you can also provide basic nursing and medical care, and since there is no guarantee that attaching the terminally ill to a respirator etc. will extend his life (or that the room and equipment will be available), and there is always concern that being hospitalized could expose this patient to inherent hospital hazards, Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a permits the egress of the patient from the hospital to his home.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a.
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Posted 1/25/2013 2:03 PM |
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#249 Inviting an Ovel for Shabbos during the year of mourning for kiruv purposes
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Q. I understand that an Avel observing Aveilus for a parent does not visit friends during the year, such as going away to friends and relatives for Shabbos.
One of my secular cousins lost a parent. May I invite him and his family for Shabbos with Kiruv in mind, since in any case he will not be observing the finer points of Hilchos Aveilus anyway. On the other hand, I would not want to engage in Kiruv using a technique that is presently halacha-proscribed, as I would be helping him transgress and as I would be bringing him close to a watered-down Judaism.
A. Remah (Y.D. 390, 2) writes that our tradition is for an Ovel not to partake in any kind of feast outside of his home during the period of mourning. However many Poiskim rule that this does not apply to a regular Shabbos meal. (Sheilas Yavetz 2, 180 in regards to a Sholom Zochor - Gesher Hachaim p. 233 - Kol Bo p. 361). Some Poiskim are more stringent. (Piskey Teshuvo Y.D. 390, 2 . See Igrois Moishe Y.D. 3, 161 who permits attending a Sholom Zochor of a relative or friend).
Horav Shlomo Miller's opinion is that it is permitted to invite an Ovel during the year of mourning especially for kiruv purposes. He added that you may also consider the possibility that there may not be an obligation of avelus at all if the deceased was not Torah observant.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 1/18/2013 1:42 PM |
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#248 Questioning what is written in the Torah
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Q. I attended this week a parsha shiur where it was mentioned that Moshe was at fault for questioning Hashem on his promise to help the Jews. How come then we are allowed to ask all kind of questions on what the Torah or Hashem say in the chumash?
A. Rambam, mentions as the first of the Thirteen Principles of Faith (Commentary on the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 10, 1) "I believe with complete faith that the Creator, blessed be His name, is the Creator and Guide of all the created beings, and that He alone has made, does make, and will make all things". As such we are to believe that everything He does is done for the utmost best and care, and we accept His designs and decisions.
When we pose a question on the events related in the Torah we are not questioning the validity or soundness of Hashem's decrees, rather their meaning and interpretation and that is permitted and encouraged.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 1/18/2013 1:25 PM |
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#247 Expressing opinions regarding the appropriateness of a shidduch
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Q. When asked about a potential shidduch, is it permissible to express an opinion regarding the appropriateness of the match (for example, how well the families are suited to each other), or do you have to stick to the facts as you know them personally?
A. Pischei Teshuvah (O. H. 156) writes that although the Magen Avraham and the mussar sforim write at length concerning the prohibition of lashon hara, there is an even greater transgression. That is refraining from informing another about a situation in which he can be victimized, thus violating the injunction "You shall not stand by the blood of your brother." (Vaykro 19:16)
However, Chofetz Chaim (H. Lashon Hora 10,2) rules that in a shiduch information request, one is allowed to convey only factual data. The knowledge of the particulars also has to be generally first hand or from one's own experience and personal observation.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a opinion is that it is prohibited to express one's own personal feelings and subjective evaluation of the suitability of a shiduch, if it cannot be substantiated with facts. This may bring to an end an otherwise good and viable shiduch. However, if one is specifically asked for a personal opinion, he may offer it, as long as he makes it clear that this is only his particular and unproven point of view.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as advised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 1/10/2013 5:40 PM |
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#246 Pretending to be a customer to see how competitors are pricing out jobs
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Q. I need to see how my competitors are pricing out jobs. They are not Jewish. Can I pretend to be a customer and get them to provide me with a quote for a job? Or is this a problem?
A. The Mishna in Baba Metzia (58b) mentions "Just as there is wronging in buying and selling, so is there wrong done by words". Therefore one must not ask another, 'what is the price of this article?' if he has no intention of buying. This is codified in Shulchan Aruch (C. M. 228, 4). The Talmud (Chulin 94a) quotes Shmuel's opinion that it is forbidden to deceive people including gentiles. This is codified too (ibid. 228,6).
Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a reckons that since there is a possibility, however unlikely, that the price offered by one of your competitors is low enough to entice you to buy directly from him and then resell the product, provide other services to you customer and still make some profit, asking for a quote is not misleading.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 1/7/2013 12:37 PM |
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#245 Can a well-toasted slice of bread be considered a Shaleim?
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Q. I have heard that if a piece of matzah is broken and I place it into the oven to bake further until the broken edge browns, that this piece has the status of a Shaleim and can be used as one of the Lechem Mishnah.
Assuming this to be correct, can a well-toasted slice of bread be considered a Shaleim and how browned must it have become?
A. It has become an accepted practice to re-bake or flame the edge of a broken matza to turn it into a shleimo (Seder Haoruch 22,4 – Maadaney Yom Tov ch. 122 – Palgey Mayim 21 – Sidur Pesach Kehilchoso p. 22).
Poiskim disagree as to how much of the matza should be missing to make this necessary, also if the roundness of the matza has to be restored and if it can be done on Yom Tov (Shaarey Teshuva 274,1 – Maadaney Yom Tov ibid.).
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit’a opinion is that the above does not apply to turning a slice of toast into a complete "sholem" bread, as after all, it would be recognized by all as only a well browned slice of bread.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 1/4/2013 11:51 AM |
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#244 Toveling and Kasheing stored new dishes that look used.
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Q. I bought a set of china dishes about 6 years ago when my husband and I got married.
It was service for 12 but at the time we decided to just tovel half the dishes and tovel the rest as needed.
This shabbos we happen to need the extra settings. I went to tovel the other dishes today, and noticed on the dinner plates that A. there was no sticker like the other plates had, B. there was a yellow residue on two of the plates.
When I first noticed there were no stickers, I though I may have a vague recollection of toveling these dishes or at least preparing them to be toveled all those years ago, but I cannot be certain. It is possible that we did tovel them at some point and even use them, but I really cannot remember.
I'm concerned that they may have been used and sold to us as new. I have no idea.
What is the status of the plates? Can I use them?
A. Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a opinion is that you do not have to be concerned that the dishes were used prior to your purchase. You should tovel the dishes without a brocho. (in general, Poiskim maintain that china or glazed earthenware dishes should be immersed without a brocho)
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 1/2/2013 12:53 PM |
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#243 Refusing an Aliya.
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Q. In my shul the Gabbai hands out cards to those who will be called up for an aliyah, indicating for which aliyah the congregant will be called up. On occasion I receive the card for an aliyah for which I feel I am not fit. Examples are: the Haftarah on Shabbas Shuvah or on a Taanis Tzibbur. I feel that someone special should be one who calls on the congregation to do T'shuva or to seek out Hashem. And I am not special enough for that position.
I understand that would I be called up for any aliyah I may not refuse, as this is an affront to the Torah. But perhaps the cards do not create this obligation.
May I refuse the aliyah? And if I accept the card, may I return it with the refusal until the point where I am called up?
A. The Talmud (Brachos 55a) teaches "Three things shorten a man's days and years: To be given a scroll of the Torah to read from and to refuse". Although the Rif, Rosh, Meiri and others did codify this statement, Rambam, Tur and Shulchan Oruch, did not. Eliahu Rabah (139, 2) explains that the Talmudic adage applied only on earlier times when each person called would read the Torah himself, unlike in our days when the Baal Koreh reads aloud.
Chidah in Chaim Shoal (13) mentions the above, as the reason for the Sephardic tradition not to call to the Torah using one's name (see also Halichot Olam 7,195, and Torah Lishma 95).
If there is a valid reason for not wanting the aliyah, a person can refuse, as when the called reads himself and is unprepared (Mishna Berura 139: 1), when he is unable to contribute for Tzdaka and will be embarrassed not to make the accustomed Misheberach (Torah Lishma 428), he stammers (Maayan Omer 7,9), or is afraid of Ain Horah, as when called right after father or brother were given an aliya (Yalkut Yosef 2 p. 118).
However, Chashukei Chemed (Bava Metzia 22a – Yuma p. 307), expresses doubt when a Rabbi refuses an aliya, due to the uncertainty of the sincerity of the one who paid and is now granting the honor of the kivud given to him.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a opinion is that even when not called by name, one should not refuse because he thinks himself as undeserving. On the contrary, that is the appropriate indication of being truly worthy.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 12/28/2012 12:37 PM |
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#242 Listening to a Torah tape on the Nit'l night
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Q. Can you listen to a Toiro tape on the Nitl night?
A. This Shayleh actually is mentioned responsa Chai Binyomin (p. 301) where he argues that although you comply with the mitzvah of learning Torah just by listening and thinking (O.H. 47, 4 and Biur Halocho ibid.), since you do not make a brocho, (see Mishnah Berura ibid.) this form of learning may be different enough to permit it on Nit"l night.
Nitey Gavriel (Hanukah end of Volume p. 247) also permits thinking Torah thoughts on Leil Nit"l, basing this conclusion on the opinion that angels do not know the thoughts of humans.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 12/25/2012 7:50 PM |
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#241 Learning the halochos and customs of nit'l on nit'l
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Q. Can you learn the halochos and customs of nit'l on nit'l?
A. On the prior question, it was mentioned that Nitey Gavriel (End of the Chanukah volume) quotes eight different reasons for not learning Torah on Nit'l Night. One of the reasons (p. 245, #2) cited in the name of Korban Nessanel, is that it is due to mourning.
It is similar to the prohibition on learning Torah on Tisha Beav, as Torah learning effects happiness and those are occasions of grief, loss and anniversaries of persecution for us. It would stand to reason, that just like in Tisha Beav you may learn the laws that pertain to that day or about the sad experiences, stories and happenings related to the date, so it would during Nit"l.
Indeed the Zichronos L'ben Yerushalaim (R' Y . Yelin - Tome II p. 19) relates that the Zais Raanon (The Gaon of Kutnah) would gather all his talmidim and use the occasion for exactly that purpose.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 12/25/2012 7:48 PM |
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#240 Learning on Leil Nit'l
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Q. Dear Rabbi, A couple of time sensitive questions; I belong to a chasidishe mishpocho that doest not learn on nit'l, but I do have my shiurim that I don't want to miss. Do I have to be matir neder if I want to attend tonight?
A. The name "Nit'l" is said to originate from the Latin and connotes birth, as in; Natalis dies Domini, or birthday of the Lord (Sefer Nitzochon, p. Bereshis). It is the tradition of avoiding learning Torah, mainly on the eve of the 25th of December (there are different traditions as to the exact date and the amount of time involved). Chasam Soifer (7,31) and Mekor Chaim (O.H. 155) testify to the widespread adherence to this Minhag in their days. It also goes back many centuries. One of the Rishonim, the Baal Harokeach (c.4960 - 1200) mentions it, as quoted in Megaleh Amukos (Parshas Terumoh. Nitey Gavriel (Hanukah, end of volume) cites eight different reasons and sources for the tradition. Today, it is kept mainly in Chasidic circles and is totally disregarded by Sefardim, those who adhere to the Lithuanian-Ashkenazi traditions and many mainstream Yeshivos. It is important to mention that many of those who do observe Leil Nit'l, sleep until midnight, and then learn for the rest of the night.
Although the answer to this question may depend on the background of the Poisek you consult, Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a opinion is that it is not necessary to be matir neder, in order to learn Torah on the Nit'l night.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 12/25/2012 7:44 PM |
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#239 Disclosing allegations when suggesting a Shidduch.
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Q. Investigating a potential match for a young lady, We came across information on a website saying the man had allegedly molested several boys in the past. When the shidduch suddenly came to a halt, it was discovered that the shadchan was aware of the information all along. The shadchan had decided to make a unilateral decision after speaking to the accused man in question on several occasions and decided his innocence. The shadchan has stated that there are two others that she intends to broach the shidduch to and does not feel the need to disclose this information as she contends the man was wrongly accused and the girl should ask forgiveness from the potential match because of her refusal to meet with him.
We are horrified and feel this is a breach of lo samod al dam reyecha and the young woman was traumatized by the whole incident particularly because the shadchan broached the shidduch knowing this information.
Halachically, what should be done to stop the shadchan from continuing to set-up unsuspecting young women with this alleged perpetrator?
What is the obligation and extent that this information should be made known to others?
A. Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a opinion in regard to this and similar shiduchin questions is that great care should be taken by a Shadchen, organization or anyone involved in matchmaking or marriage counselling, not to accept allegations as an established truth. Often the reputation of a person is irreversibly destroyed by unproven assertions of misconduct, that end up as either totally or at least partially false. Half truths often snowball into perceived terrible mistaken "realities".
However, he maintains that if indeed there are serious concerns, albeit yet unproven in Bais Din or challenged in court, the shadchen is obligated to bring the information available to the attention of the party involved by the second date. Again, care should be taken to indicate that they are only allegations and yet unproven charges.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 12/25/2012 7:40 PM |
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#238 Divorced woman covering their hair
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Q. As a divorced woman do I need to cover my hair: when at Shul, in public, all the time?
A. Shulchan Oruch (E.H. 21, 2) rules that Jewish women should not go out with uncovered hair to public places, regardless if married or not. Perisha, Bais Shmuel, Beer Heitev, (ibid. 3 and 5) and others explain that "unmarried" refers to a widow or a divorced woman.
Igrois Moishe (E.H. 1,57 and 4,32,4) rules that in cases of severe economic need, (as the loss of ones job due to keeping this mitzvah) the above-mentioned women are not obligated to comply with the mitzvah of covering their hair. He adds that the same applies when this is a factor in assisting them to remarry.
However, many contemporary Poskim disagree, as they see this as a prohibition and not only a mitzvah (Yesodos Habais Ukedushoso p. 80 - Meir Oz 75,2,10). Some argue that the quality hairpieces available today hardly create hardship.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit"a opinion is indeed to be stringent.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 12/25/2012 1:29 AM |
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#237 Purchasing an item with other people's money.
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Q. A fellow came into shul before Chanukah and saw 20 bottles of olive oil on the table with a notice that read: "Each bottle 19 shekels, please put the money in the pushka." The fellow figured out that the owner stands to make 380 shekels on the sale. He switched the sign for one of his own that read: "Each bottle 20 shekels, please put the money in the pushka." And took one without paying.
Considering that 20 shekels for that oil is still a great bargain, and the owner will still make 380 shekels, what has the fellow done wrong?
A. An almost exact shailah is to be found in sefer Chashukei Chemed (Baba Metziah 76a), where Horav Silverstein Shlit"a rules that the overpaid money has to be returned to the buyers, even though they willingly paid it. The enterprising fellow is a gazlan, as he took a bottle of oil that he was not entitled to.
Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a agrees with this ruling
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit"a
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Posted 12/25/2012 1:15 AM |
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