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Have a question? Send it in! Questions are answered by Rabbi Bartfeld.
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# 836 Sombre Shote
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Q. A patient who is so depressed that becomes irrational, is he a halachic shote at that time?
A. In the expressions of our sages one suffering from depression is named a Baal Moro Shechoro or suffering from Melankolio. Divrei Malkiel (7: 36 ) maintains that he is the classic case mentioned in Talmud (Chagiga 3b) as “the one who sleeps over in a cemetery,” or “walks around at wee hours of the night alone.” However, other Poskim disagree. (Aruch Hashulchan E.H. 121: 13., Piskey Teshuva ibid. ) Some maintain that although there may be an indication of the beginning of the process of becoming a shoiteh, he is still sane. (Responsa Chasam Sofer E. H. 2: 2)
Horav Shlomo Miller’s Shlit”a opinion is that all cases differ and a correct ruling depends on many different factors. He advises to consult a competent Rabbi when necessary.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/14/2015 2:39 PM |
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# 835 Did he Find his Mind?
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Q. If he (a patient that has lost most of his memory) regains some memory only from time to time and only then is rational, is he liable on mitzvos when he is well?
A. See prior answer where Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a indicated that one who suffers of memory loss, even severe by itself does not qualify as a shoiteh, unless he becomes detached from reality and is incapacitated. Shulchan Aruch (E. H. 121: 3) rules that one who is sometimes healthy mentally and sometimes not, during his periods of sanity he is considered in Halacha capable for everything. Poskim maintain that the above is correct even when at his healthy intervals he still shows some signs of illness. (Beis Yosef E.H. 121 quoting Responsa Rashbo et. al.)
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a.
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Posted 7/14/2015 2:37 PM |
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# 834 Maybe Confused But No Shoiteh
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Q. A few questions concerning elderly patients. A patient that has lost most of his memory but is still rational and understands and can follow a conversation, is that patient considered a shote and is he exempt of mitzvos or can he still make kidush and havdala for someone else?
A. The Talmud (Chagigah 3b-4a)i lists three actions that are characteristic of the disorder: (1) going out unaccompanied at night, (2) sleeping in a cemetery and (3) tearing one’s garments. On 4a the Talmud provides a fourth illustration: (4) a shoiteh loses everything that is given to him. Rashi (ibid.) explains that a shoiteh is exempt from Halachic obligations, exonerated from punishment, and prevented from participating in business transactions.
Rambam (H. Edus 9: 9,) rules that the term shoiteh is not exclusive to one who walks naked, destroys objects, or throws stones. It includes anyone whose mind is confused and whose processes of thought or conduct are adversely affected, even if he is able to communicate and respond properly.
The S'mah (C. M. 35: 10) contends that shotim are granted special treatment in Halacha because they are detached from reality. They suffer from cognitive deficiencies, and consequently, lack a typical awareness about the world around them.
Some Poskim however maintain that the characteristics mentioned in the Talmud are essential to declare someone a shoiteh (Beis Yosef E. H. 121 quoting Maharik, Zichron Yosef E. H. 10, Tzemach Tzedek E.H. 153, Divrei Chaim E. H. 1: 53 and 73 – 85, et. al.)
Igrois Moshe (E.H. 120) rules that the status of shoiteh only applies to the sufferer for the time during which they are in their confused state and only regarding matters in which they are confused. (See also Torah Umaddah 12: 158-178) in regards to the Halacha status of patients who suffer from Alzheimer's disease.)
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is that even according to the view of the Rambam, serious memory loss per se, does not qualify someone as a shoiteh, unless he becomes detached from reality and recites kidush on weekdays. But if he knows that it is Shabbos and is able to recite kidush he can do so also for someone else.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/14/2015 2:33 PM |
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# 833 No-Name Bracha II
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Re: Question (810) about Mekadeish Shemo Borabim
Q. I pray Nusach Ashkenaz-Minhag Frankfurt where the Nusach for that Bracha is "Mekadeish Es Shimcho Borabim." I have noticed that it is unlike any other Bracha I have encountered. Every other Bracha uses third-person in its concluding Bracha, except for that one. Do you have any explanation for that anomaly?
A. See prior answer in regards to why brochos change from a beginning in second person to a third person end.
Mekadesh Es Shimcho Borabim is not the only exception. S'forim quote another two, namely the end of the thanks giving brocho in the amida; “Hatov Shimcho Ulecha Noe Lehodos” and avoda on Yom Tov, “Sheoscho Levad'cho Beyiro Na'avod.”
Nefesh Chayo, (O.H. 46, Taleley Oros – Tefilos p. 394) explains that these two blessings differ from all others in that they do not contain praise to Hashem and His works, rather they refer to the acts of men and the duties they should perform. These include man thanking Hashem and serving Him with awe, obligations that we concede and acknowledge directly to Him. One may add that giving thanks should be said directly.
Shvocho Shel Aharon (p. 43) mentions the question why is "Mekadeish Es Shimcho Borabim" different. He elucidates providing the background of a medresh that assures that the brochos are to be said only in the present world and not in the world to come, since then they will be needless. The exception is giving thanks that will always be timely. Therefore thanks-giving brochos are said directly to Hashem since then His presence will be manifest and we will address Him directly. That time will obviously correspond as well to "Mekadeish Es Shimcho Borabim."
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/14/2015 2:30 PM |
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#832 Talk To Him
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Q. Why when we say a brocho we begin by speaking directly to Hashem, as in Baruch Ata (blessed be You) and when we end the bracha we speak of Hashem in third person, as in Bore Pri Haetz (who created the fruit of the tree)?
A. The better-known reason is given by the Rashbo (Teshuvos 5: 52) who explains that there are two fundamental principles on which all of our beliefs rest. One is the truth of the existence and beingness of Hashem. That knowledge has to be so crystal clear in our minds, as if we would be standing and seeing Hashem in front of us and talking directly to Him. The second basic truth is that no creation of His, will ever be able to fully understand what He really is. His essence will always be for us, the fruits of His creation, hidden in mystery (nistar). Therefore the blessings contain the speech forms that represent those two fundamental beliefs.
Oitzros Habrocho (p. 167) adds another perspective. When one addresses Hashem directly, one should begin to realize to whom he is really speaking. Thus he should become totally overwhelmed with plain fright, deep felt awe, and respect. Those profound emotions would force a response to hide and seek refuge. Therefore we end the brocho in a third person grammatical form.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/10/2015 6:55 PM |
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#831 Lip Service?
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Q. I wonder constantly why do we say every day three times a day in the amida in the bracha dedicated to the coming of Mashiach, the words “ki lishuat'cha kivinu kol hayom,” or “since we hope for Your salvation the whole day, and wait” Is that not lying openly to Hashem? How could we be so brazen?
A. Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a explained that there are different degrees of consciousness in the mind. At some subliminal level all Jewish souls posses a constant desire for salvation and Bias Hamoshiach.
The Radal (Hagohos on Shir Hashirim Rabbo ch. 7) maintains the correct girsa or wording is Kol Yom, (every day) omitting the letter ה, because of that same concern. However, Talelei Oros (Tefilos p.320) quotes that the Brisker Rov zt”l would interpret the Tefila literally as it is written. The above (ibid.) also quotes Horav Yosef Shoul Natanzon zt'l as explaining that the day in this tefila, refers to the day of Hashem, which is a thousand years.
Other interpretations aver that the tefilos are said in plural since they include the whole nation of Israel. Indeed, when we consider everyone together the statement is true (Rabbi S. Spero). In addition, the word “kivinu” is past tense. Certainly, in the past there were great tzadikim, that could have sincerely said that statement. (R' Avner Milevsky.)
The word “Ki” also has different meanings, adding to “since” the words “if”, “maybe” and “but.” Some of those interpretations may provide an answer.
Horav Yaakov Galinski zt'l (Vehigadto Balak) explains that everyone expects and desires a yeshua, salvation or help, since that is the normal human condition. What exactly that yeshua entitles depends on the individual. For some it may be something quite banal and inconsequential; for others it is indeed the real thing.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/7/2015 5:16 PM |
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# 830 Mama Rochel Cry
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Q. Is there relevance for what some say that we should not name our newborn baby girl Rochel?
(need answer urgent)
A. In Shaar HaPsukim (Par. Vayetze) the Arizal writes that the names of the Imahos or foremothers that include the letter ה were destined to have children. The one that did not, namely Rochel, only conceived after she gave her maid-servant Bilha (two letters hey) to Ya'akov, so she could also conceive through her.
Kovetz Beis Hillel (16: p. 71) quotes that the Ohr Letzion (Horav Ben Tzion Abba Shaul zt”l) was once approached by a woman who suffered from severe illness and could not conceive. When she told him that her name was Rochel he advised her to change it to another name. She did and she was healed.
Otzros Chaim (p.144) mentions something similar in regards to Rus and how Neomi was able to find a Tikun for her through Boaz.
Niflois Mitorosecho ( Vayigash: p. 141) mentions that the letter ה stands for Herayon or pregnancy. See also Maharsho (Chidushei Agodos – Sanhedrin 107a on regards to this letter and its connection to having children.
However, Derech Sicha (end of Bereshis) mentions that Horav Chaim Kanievsky Shlit”a was asked if there is significance in not using the name Rochel. To what he replied that it is totally meaningless (he quotes the words of the Arizal above in the name of the Chezkuni) and added that reality proves that many women that are named Rochel have children and are healthy. He also mentions that Rochel, the wife of Rabi Akiva had children (Avos DeRabi Nosson 6) and so obviously did the mother of Romi Bar Rochel.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is similar to Derech Sicha.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a.
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Posted 7/3/2015 5:36 PM |
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# 829 Picture Perfect Food
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Q. Can one leave on recording security cameras on Shabbos for the purpose of kashrus, bosor shenisalem, bishul akum on a house with a caregiver or in an shul where kidush is served and there is no mashgiach temidi?
A. Although, some Poskim are stringent on the use of recording security cameras instead of human supervisors for kashrus (Teshuvos Vehanhogos Y.D. 255) their use today is expanding.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit'a opinion is that if the screen monitor is off, and only the recording devise is on, it would be permitted to record during Shabbos when the individuals being recorded are Gentiles (see last questions)
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/3/2015 5:34 PM |
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# 828 Yichud's Kodak Moment
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Q. Can the security cameras remain on during Shabbos just to save the patient from yichud (seclusion) prohibitions when left alone with the female care-giver?
Horav Nissim Karelitz Shlit”a (quoted in Moriah-Elul 5771 p.146) maintains that security cameras are to be regarded as an open door to the street in regards to the yichud prohibition, which the Node Beyihuda (E.H. 71) permits. He mentions that they do not have to be scrutinized on real time, as long as there is a possibility that the tape (or digital recording) could later be seen, and it is an effective deterrent.
Minchas Ish (p. 267) permits yichud inside the safe deposit-box room in banks, due to the presence of security cameras. See also Nitey Gavriel (Yivhud 45: 8 – p 283)
However, Horav Elbak (on above article) writes that the recording would not be permitted on Shabbos, since it does not meet the standards required in our last question and in # 648.
Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a advised that in order to leave the cameras and recording equipment on during Shabbos, a random timer should be added in order to avoid this becoming a case of psik reisha or certainty of committing a prohibition. There should also not be a light or other on-indicator on the camera when recording.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/3/2015 5:32 PM |
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# 827 Candid Camera Care
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Q. An elderly person is under the constant care of a female non-Jewish caregiver. Can the family maintain on Shabbos the recording security cameras to ensure that he is given proper care?
A. In question 648 on this forum we wrote: Many Poskim rule leniently in the use of security cameras on Shabbos, which are today in widespread use on many streets, buildings, hotels, outside of nearly every business and gas station, outside of many private homes, shuls and even the Kosel.
There are different reasons mentioned by the various Poskim such as;
a) Although it is a Psik Reisha, (or the prohibited inevitable consequence of an action) the passerby does not care or intend to be recorded and does not benefit from being photographed. He only benefits from the system when there is an unwelcome intruder; thus becoming a p'sik reisha delo nicha lei or unwanted psik reisha, which Shulchan Aruch O.H. 320:18 permits in some rabbinic prohibition
b) The camera is in service and recording regardless if one walks by or not. Therefore the person's movement activates nothing; the camera automatically records images, whether the person is there or not.
c) Being photographed is not considered a direct action unless one intends to be photographed. If one merely walks in front of the camera, the meleches machsheves is lacking and it is only a g'romo or indirect action.
d) The electronic image is technically not a form of "writing." Additionally, since the data is not being permanently recorded (it usually erases automatically after a period of time), it is at worst a rabbinical prohibition. (See above a)
(Horav Moshe Feinstein zt"l in a letter to R' Yisroel Rozen of the Tzomet Institute,
Yabia Omer 9:35, Horav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l - quoted in Ateres Shlomo 6, p57, Betzel HaChochmo 6:65, Shulchan Shlomo 340: note 12b, 39 Melochos and others)
Some years ago (Kislev 71) it became widely publicized that Horav Eliashiv zt"l ruled stringently. His psak was that although police cameras may not present a difficulty, since there is the added factor of "security concern," non- security cameras, such as the Eish Hatorah Wall Camera are different and therefore one should avoid visiting the Kosel on Shabbos. Eish Hatorah reports that they complied with his request and since then they tilt the camera upward on Shabbos. (See also Orchos Shabbos 15, note 55 quoting a personal conversation Between Horav Eliashuv Zt'l and Ylch"t Horav Heinemann Shlit"a)
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion in this particular case is to be lenient and maintain the recording equipment on for the sake of the proper treatment of the patient. However, the live monitor should be turned off as it is basically of no consequence during Shabbos. In need the tapes can be reviewed after Shabbos.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/3/2015 5:30 PM |
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# 826 Wave Gut Shabbes to the Camera?
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Q. At a bris mila done on Shabbos, the security camera on the entrance to the hall was left on. Can the family now use the recording to keep a memento and make a recording of the occasion?
A. A similar question is found in Chasukei Chemed (Shabbos 149a) where a permitted security recording was done in the hospital where the oifruff for a hospitalized chosson took place. Horav Zilberstein Shlit”a ruled not to allow the use the recording for a personal or a family souvenir of the event. If from the onset, one has the intention of leaving the video equipment on for both uses, recording on Shabbos would be prohibited. Similarly, he also rules that a doctor should not write on Shabbos with a personal intention or benefit, even if it is also needed for saving someone's life.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is similar, the reason being that it constitutes an act of zilzul or disregard for the holiness of Shabbos and opens a gate of opportunity for others to arrange the filming of events and simchos on Shabbos.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/3/2015 5:28 PM |
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# 825 Come Again?
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Q. After a Ger converted (and was advised to avoid constant contact with his parents that could be spiritually detrimental to the Ger and his family) what frequency of visits is considered to be constant contact?
A. Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is that it depends on the case, and each one should be valued on its own needs and the difficulties and challenges it presents . When in doubt a competent Rabbi should be consulted.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/3/2015 5:26 PM |
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# 824 Step Parents?
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Q. A Ger who converted many years ago was told not to maintain constant contact with his parents as before his conversion. Now that his mother is aged, ill and alone and requires continual care, and no one else is left to care for her, can he maintain constant contact?
Is it advisable to bring his children to visit their grandmother, if she is pained by not seeing them?
A. The Talmud (Yevamos 22a) teaches that although a ger who converts is considered as a new born person and looses his familial connections to his biological family, rabbinically he cannot marry his sister or other close relatives. The Talmud explains that the reason is, people will say the ger left a stronger sanctity and converted to a lesser and more lenient religion.
Rambam (H. Ma'amrim 5: 11) rules that not only should a ger observe the negative commandments in regards to dishonouring or shaming his parents, but he should also show some honor and respect to them. (See also Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 241: 9) Yad Avrohom explains that honoring parents is an obligation for Bnei Noach, as we can infer from the narrative of Chom Ben Noach, yet they are not punished for non-compliance as they are in the case of the other seven Noahide mitzvos. Rabi Akiva Eiger in his notes (ibid.) maintains that it is referring to the way Gentiles in their own beliefs and laws, greatly honor their progenitors.
Igrois Moshe (Y.D. 2: 130) in a similar shaile rules that even when the parent is not ill, the ger is permitted an occasional visit and is also allowed to bring along his children. However, he should do so infrequently so that the children will not adhere to the former religion of their father, join his grandparents in eating non-kosher and do other common prohibitions.
Otherwise, in case of need or illness, just as one has to take care and visit the afflicted gentiles and tend to their needs, certainly and more so, the ger has to take care of his own parents. (See also Nishmas Avrohom 2: p. 276)
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is similar.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/3/2015 5:24 PM |
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# 823 Nu! a Lender Be
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Q. If thirty days is the time for repayment for borrowing money. If I lend an object such a tool or a book is the term also 30 days?
A. Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 73: 1) rules that the thirty day period for repayment applies only to money which is given to spend or invest and not to have exactly the same coins, bills or checks returned. However, when it comes to lending objects the thirty day rule does not apply. Mishna Berura (307: 42) rules accordingly. Miktzoa BaTorah (73: 3) depend the rule of thirty days only on the language used, which customarily is in Hebrew “halva'a” for currency loans, while “shailah” is wont for lending objects. According to his opinion if the expression halva'a was used for objects the thirty day rule will take effect and it will not even for currency if the term “shaila” was mentioned. However, in English where there is no grammatical distinction for these two actions, it all depends on the case and the local custom. (See also Pischei Mishpat ibid. 2)
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is that in regards to borrowing objects, obviously some such a car, some tools or a pen are to be returned immediately after finishing their use, while on books that one reads from cover to cover, the lending period is longer.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 7/2/2015 11:23 PM |
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# 822 Pringles Do Grow From the Ground?
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Pringles Do Grow From the Ground?
Q. Good morning Rabbi Bartfeld,
Attached is the Daf Hakashrus with article on bracha on pringles.
Could you please clarify with Rav Miller what is the correct Bracha?
Thank you,
A. The article provided is from Rabbi Eli Gersten published on the Daf Hakashrus of June 2015. It addresses the proper bracha for Pringles and other such foods that are primarily made from potato flakes and potato flour
It mentions the following; “Rav Belsky, Shlita said, that originally Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l held that on potato flakes one should say Shehakol. When potatoes are turned into powder, they lose their status as a vegetable; therefore even after they are reconstituted they remain Shehakol. Rema (O.C. 202:7) explains that if a fruit or vegetable is pulverized to the point that it is no longer distinguishable, then it loses its bracha. Therefore, Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 208:8) says that the proper bracha to be said on corn or bean bread is Shehakol. Based on this psak the Daf HaKashrus (Vol. 22, No. 5, p.32) printed that the bracha on Pringles is Shehakol.
However, Rav Belsky more recently clarified, that in later years Rav Moshe Feinstein zt”l reversed his position, and said that since reconstituted potato flakes are a common equivalent substitute for mashed potatoes, it is not considered as though they have lost their shape and form, and the bracha on reconstituted potato flakes remains Ha’adamah. Rav Elimelech Bluth,Shlita and Rav Reuven Feinstein, Shlita confirmed hearing this change of psak from Rav Moshe zt”l as well. Therefore, Pringles
though they are made from reconstituted potatoes, would be the same as though they were made from fresh mashed potatoes, and the proper bracha would be Ha’adamah.
However, it is worth noting that potato starch does not reconstitute back into a potato, and therefore products that are made from potato starch are Shehakol.”
It should be mentioned that Ohr Somayach in its Ask the Rabbi feature cites that Jerusalem's Rabbi Meir Bransdorfer, shlita, ruled that the bracha for Pringles is Shehakol. However, in Halachos of Brachos Rabbi Bodner writes, that Horav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach zt”l ruled that since Pringles have the appearance of a potato after they are made from the dehydrated potatoes, a hoadama should be made.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is that the correct brocho for Pringles in indeed Hoadomo.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 6/29/2015 11:17 PM |
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# 821 Keeping Shloishim?
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Q. Thank you so much for answering my previous questions, I have a few more.
I was in shul and someone borrowed a hundred dollars so he could pay for his overdue aliyos. I understood that he would repay it a.s.a.p. the next day. When I asked him then for the money he said he has 30 days to repay, is that correct?
A. Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 73: 1) rules that only when there is no established custom the rule of thirty days for repayment applies, otherwise whatever the common local practice is will take effect. Ritvo (Makos 3b) maintains that it is not the way of people to borrow money and repay it immediately or the next day, but that may not be true for small amounts. Mishna Berura (307: 42) quotes Magen Avrohom (ibid.) that in his location money loans were collected immediately.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is that when in doubt as to what the local tradition is, the thirty day rule will apply.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 6/26/2015 3:49 PM |
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# 820 Tovel or not Tovel, That is the Shaila
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Q. What if I'm invited to someones house and I'm not sure if they toveled their dishes, can you eat there?
Thank you. Have a nice day and Shabbat Shalom.
A. In general people who are considered Torah observant maintain a chazaka ok kashrus, meaning that we may assume that they practice all mitzvos in a proper fashion, unless we know otherwise.
In this particular case, even if you became aware that the utensils were not immersed in a mikva,
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlit”a opinion is that in need you may still eat on that venue, since the obligation of tevilas kelim rests on the owner of the utensils and not on the user. This is similar to the permitted entering into someones house that does not have mezuzos installed. The responsibility of placing mezuzos lays on the owner.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 6/26/2015 3:46 PM |
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# 819 Glat But Not Pure
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Q. What happens if one uses (dishes or utensils) that were not toveled (immersed in a mikva)?
Can you eat the food?
A. According to Tosafos (Avoda Zara 75b – d'h vechulan) it is a Tannaic dispute in the Talmud (ibid.) if after the fact of someone cooking or using non-immersed utensils, the contained food becomes prohibited rabbinically, as a measure of precaution for avoiding the usage of all non-kosher utensils. Some authorities maintain that it may even be a biblical injunction (Or Zarua 293 and others)
Halacha follows the opinion that it is permitted (Rema Y.D. 120: 16) Yabia Omer (Y.D. 2) rules that although the food is permitted, it should be removed immediately from the non-toveled container
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 6/26/2015 3:43 PM |
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# 818 Shalal Dunk
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Q. BS"D, Dear Rabbi Bartfeld, Regarding toveling of dishes, utensils, I see nowhere in the Torah, midrash, tanach etc. to tovel dishes, I think that this is strictly a rabbinic law.
Can you please answer why we have to tovel dishes?
A. The Talmud (Avoda Zara 75b) deduces the mitzva of immersing utensils used for food consumption from the posuk on Parshas Matos (Bamidbar 31: 23) relating to the booty taken from the Midianites; “Everything that comes into the fire, you shall pass through fire and it will become pure”, Though the addition of the redundant word “Vetaher” the Torah added another type of purification besides purging (koshering from prohibited foods imbedded in the utensil), namely tevila. The Talmud presents there an additional source for tevilas kelim, namely from the words: “B'mei nida ischata,” (ibid.) and explains the need for the two sources. The obligation to immerse kelim in a mikva is recorded by the Rambam (M’aacholos Assuros 17: 3, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 120 : 1, and in virtually any Halacha sefer dealing on the topic.
Most Poskim maintain that the mitzvah is biblical, at least for metal utensils, since it is inferred from the above verse. (Rashi Avoda Zara ibid., Tosafot ibid. Smak 199, Or Zarua 288 – 293, Raved, Ramban, Rashbo, Ritva on Talmud ibid, et. al.) Some Poskim, however, opine that tevilas kelim is only Rabbinical (Rambam ibid., Tosafot Rid on Talmud above, Orchos chaim 2: p. 154 et. al.)
Talmud Yerushalmi (Avoda Zara 5: 15) explains that the reason for the immersion of utensils acquired from Gentiles is to spiritually elevate the items originated in a domain that does not observe the mitzvos or maintains the holiness of the Torah, to a realm that does. Ritva (Avoda Zara 75b) quoting Ramban, compares the process as similar to the conversion of a ger to Judaism, it also demands tevila.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 6/26/2015 3:41 PM |
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# 817 Grandfather Enclosed
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Q. If my father tells me do something that contradicts the will of my grandfather (his father), who do I listen to?
A. Rema (Y.D. 240: 24) mentions the opinion of Maharik that one is not obligated to honor his grandfather. However his ruling is that he is, but the honor to a father supersedes the grandfather. Torah Lishma and Teshuva Mehava (1: 178) explain that honoring grandparents is only rabbinical obligation while honoring parents is a biblical commandment. Chelkas Yaakov (Y.D. 135) rules that if both his father and grandfather are present and demand something from him, he should heed his grandfather, since both he and his father are obligated to honor the grandfather (See also Responsa Rabi Akiva Eiger (1: 68) for a similar opinion. Sheilas Yavetz however (2: 129) disagrees.
Horav Shlomo Miller's Shlt”a opinion is that there are many other variants to this question and additional fact information is necessary in order to establish priority. In some instances there may be no obligation to honor either one, as when it conflicts with mitzvos.
Rabbi A. Bartfeld as revised by Horav Shlomo Miller Shlit”a
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Posted 6/26/2015 3:33 PM |
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Important Numbers
