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ISRAEL NEWS

*A collection of the week's news from Israel
From the Bet El Twinning / Israel Action Committee of
Beth Avraham Yoseph of Toronto Congregation*

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commitment to the Qataris not to strike Hamas personnel on their soil. Netanyahu called President Trump minutes earlier, but the president was groggy after a late night of discussions. It took time to reach him. The strike went ahead.

Commentary...

Until Victory By Amit Segal

If Israelis had heard how the President of the United States spoke about the hostages, it's doubtful that he would have received such thunderous cheers at Hostages' Square last Saturday night. To say they were a secondary concern for him would be an understatement, and even that understates it. Donald Trump favored eliminating Hamas the American way, and 20 living hostages (he was always confused about their number and minimized it — I wonder what Sigmund Freud would have said) seemed to him a marginal matter, collateral damage.

Only belatedly did he perceive how strategic the issue was for the Israelis, and therefore for their government as well. In the United States, presidents have usually not been criticized for meeting hostages' families too little, but for doing so too often (for details, search "Ronald Reagan" on Google).

In one of the discussions before Operation Gideon's Chariots B began, Netanyahu spoke about the scar that would remain in Israeli society if Israeli forces conquered Gaza City at the cost of the hostages' lives. Allow me to guess that he never really believed the moment would come.

Indeed, in recent months, Netanyahu and Ron Dermer's perception was that an operation to conquer Gaza City, if it happens, might begin, but certainly would not reach completion. Here is the inside story.

Following the successful war in Iran, Israel tried to use the momentum to reach a partial deal. The idea was to release half the hostages and, during a 60-day ceasefire, arrive more or less at the conditions achieved this week. But Hamas, inspired by a Gaza starvation campaign that was gaining international traction, refused. President Trump, still in the shadow of Israel's victory in Iran, thought the IDF could eliminate the remnants of Hamas as quickly as it smashed Tehran's nuclear program. The combination of Hamas' refusal and the president's ambition led Israel to decide to enter Gaza City.

The idea was proposed by Minister Avi Dichter: conquering the city is the end of Hamas, he said at one meeting. The magic happened almost immediately: "Even before our forces entered the city," Dermer recounted, "three days of talk about the operation did what three months of negotiations failed to do. Hamas suddenly agreed to a partial deal. But by then time had already run out."

Israel faced two options: one, to conquer the remainder of the strip and establish a military government with American support. Dermer and Netanyahu believed that would require national unity and backing from Trump. The first component did not exist, and the second was highly unlikely.

The second option was a plan manufactured by Israel, led by the Americans, and supported by Arab states. President Reagan once told his people: you'll write the plans, and I'll be the presenter who markets them. This plan was no different, with Dermer filling the role of the writer. It was clear that any plan presented as purely Israeli would be pronounced dead before it was even born. That doesn't mean every tweet was coordinated, the minister said at the cabinet meeting this week, but on the big matters, Jerusalem and Washington moved together.

Thus began arduous negotiations with Middle Eastern countries. During a round of talks in New York, it seemed impossible to get all those elephants into the same private room. Nevertheless, Israel's representatives returned from there with 17 substantive comments from the Sunni states and even an agreement in the offing.

Then came September 9. Early in the morning, a three-person telephone consultation was held about the strike: Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Katz, and Minister Dermer. All three supported the attack. Many issues came up in the consultation, but one particular issue did not: none of them believed there was an Israeli

So far, it's unclear how senior Hamas figures escaped the attack, but it's obvious that it brought the deal closer. I recently wrote that it was the most successful failed assassination in history, in the sense that it signaled to the Qataris that the war would come to them if they did not stop their double game.

Dermer sees it differently. He links the strike to the agreement, but in a completely different way. The Qataris, it turns out, were convinced that by agreeing to host the negotiations, they had obtained immunity from Israeli strikes on their soil. From their perspective, the strike was a blatant, offense breach of the commitment.

Qatar had been unable to bring a deal for a long time, but it's not half bad at thwarting deals. "The spoiler state," they called it in Jerusalem — one that can easily ruin any agreement, as it did to the Egyptian hostage deal that was forming last spring behind its back.

Qatar is a complicated nation, Netanyahu said recently. What is it made of? In Jerusalem they describe two trains running behind the same engine. One, led by the ruler's mother and brother, supports the Muslim Brotherhood and is an unmistakable hater of Israel. The other, led by the prime minister and several other senior figures, seeks rapprochement with the West.

Around April, a turning point was identified in Doha. Relations with the United States tightened significantly, and Hamas, an oddly patronized child, became a burden and a stain. All the Arab states rushed to assemble at the emir's conference, both in anger at Israel and fear of a blue-and-white domination of the Middle East.

The Americans' genius was to convert that negative energy into fuel to propel negotiations to their goal. "You want Israel to stop? Then let's end the war," they told the Sunni countries, and thus enlisted them in a framework that seemed impossible: a pan-Arab, almost pan-Muslim commitment to the elimination of Hamas. Dermer drafted the apology for the death of the Qatari security official; in Doha they reciprocated with a goodwill gesture by dramatically toning down Al Jazeera's hostile tone.

More than enlisting them against Hamas, which had annoyed the entire Arab world, the achievement was to enlist them for a framework that does not include the Palestinian Authority in the foreseeable future. That is, for example, what held the Emiratis back from entering Gaza a year and a half ago. In one sense, that is the great innovation: before the plan, Gaza belonged to the Palestinian Authority; now it is Arab-international until further notice. The PA, meanwhile, hates Hamas so much that it agreed.

Yes, there will be a two-state solution, Dermer said this week. But not between the river and the sea — within the Gaza Strip itself. The plan is that as long as Hamas does not disarm, reconstruction will begin — but only in the half of the strip under Israeli control. What two years of war did not accomplish will be done by market forces: where will the population feel it is better to live — amid the ruins under Hamas boots, or in a rehabilitated area with an Emirati-funded school and a trailer home for each family?

The Americans believe this is a temporary situation, and are convinced that Hamas will be disarmed soon. Israel, of course, is much more skeptical. In a recent meeting, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir made a request of the Americans: Explain to me please. Your multinational force, with a few battalions, enters a tunnel. Hamas operatives are armed there. How exactly does this disarm Hamas? Who exactly will hand over the weapons? And what if they don't?

You didn't believe the first phase would happen, the Americans said, believe that the second will happen too. Have a little faith, the Jews with an American flag on their lapel told the Jews with an Israeli flag.

Many unforeseen things have happened in the past month. Here is another October surprise: when the Knesset plenum returns this coming Monday, a bill to dissolve the Knesset will not be on the

agenda. A legal opinion determined that because the bill failed last summer, 61 signatures are required to reintroduce it soon. The ultra-Orthodox were supposed to join, if only to threaten Netanyahu. But then the ceasefire deal arrived, and the opposition didn't even try. They understood there was no chance that Shas chairman Aryeh Deri would support it in such an historic moment. After all, he is no Yitzhak Goldknopf, who equates the return of hostages from Hamas captivity with the return of IDF deserters from Israeli prison.

The prime minister still wants to postpone the elections as long as possible — at least that's what he says in private. The reason? First of all is history: Netanyahu has split from partners and prompted early elections only once, during the hated Bennett-Lapid government. His playbook is that one day of rule in the hand is better than two in the bush — especially now, when peace agreements with Muslim countries are just around the corner. According to assessments, they will not help bring in a caretaker government and want to build a plan that is viable for years to come. What they do not want is to serve as material in an election campaign.

So if Netanyahu wants to delay the elections, why doesn't he give Deri and Moshe Gafni his famous treatment, which includes endless talks, meetings and not-so-mild physical pressure? After all, Shas seems to be dying to return to the government.

Maybe he's delaying the move because he was busy, then ill. And maybe, just maybe, he wants the two or three weeks of quiet he's just received to examine his options. If the polls show a dramatic turn in his favor, and if it becomes clear that the conscription law is still unpopular even during relative calm, it may be worth going to elections at the end of winter. And if — as after Iran — the needle does not move, the incentive to wait until the final moment will grow. In short, as the Bank of Israel buys dollars for a rainy day, Netanyahu is buying time.

Now that all the living hostages and all the excuses have been exhausted, the time has come for the State of Israel to make the decision it has been comfortable fleeing from for more than two years: the death penalty for the Nukhba murderers. First, so that they will not be released in the next deal — whenever it comes. But primarily, because that is what justice demands.

It is unpleasant to be a country with the death penalty, but the thought of financing this band of murderers is even less pleasant. The excuse that this would encourage terror seems ridiculous after one of the deadliest days of terror in world history. If there is no real change in every aspect of the struggle against Hamas, there will be no change in their actions toward us. What is needed is a public trial in Nir Oz, glass cells, and gallows.

Many hostage videos were released in the past year. The vast majority were published on Saturday afternoons, shortly before the rally in Hostages' Square and the demonstration on Kaplan street began. It is interesting to note two hostages of whom videos or photos were never published: Avinatan Or and Eitan Mor, the former from Shiloh and the latter from Kiryat Arba.

Hamas knew very well that the two families would not agree to broadcast even a single second filmed in the tunnels, faithful to the consensus at the start of the war: do not cooperate with Abu Obaida's psychological warfare. It was not wrong, of course: the Or family was the only one to vet those calling them during the bizarre video calls on the morning of the release.

Can a democratic state forever impose self-censorship on itself? Highly doubtful. For that reason, there is no point in legislating the recommendations of the Shamgar committee that forbid the mass release of terrorists and even meetings between the prime minister and hostages' families. One does not decree a measure the public cannot tolerate.

And yet, there is surrender, and there is surrender. The Or and Mor families set the proper standard under terrible conditions. It is a shame that the national radio stations, one funded by the government and one by the army, did not learn from them: instead of opening every hour with "We won't stop until everyone returns," they should have added: "We won't stop until victory." The government set two objectives for the war, the stations it funds decided there is only one. (Israel Hayom Oct 16)

Palestine Recognition is not About Human Rights

By Julio Levit Koldorf

Recent announcements by France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Spain and Portugal unilaterally recognizing a state for the Palestinians are being hailed as acts of courage and conscience. In reality, they expose political cowardice and the collapse of intellectual integrity in the West. The recognition of "Palestine" is not a moral breakthrough; it is a conceptual absurdity and a historical betrayal.

Why? Because human rights are either universal or meaningless. They cannot be weaponized for one group while being denied to countless others. Yet that is precisely what this recognition does: It elevates one national claim above all others—not on the basis of justice, but on political expediency.

Take the Kurds. With more than 30 million people scattered across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, they are the largest stateless nation on earth. They have fought, bled and died for independence for more than a century. Where is the recognition of Kurdistan?

Consider the Druze, massacred by Hezbollah and jihadists in Syria, who are living precariously between Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan. Has anyone proposed a state for them?

What of the Assyrians, four million strong, persecuted relentlessly across the Middle East, stripped of land, culture and voice? No international outcry.

The Yazidis, targets of a horrific ISIS genocide in 2014, are still shattered, still vulnerable. No one in any European capital even knows what the Yazidi flag looks like.

The Baha'i, born in Persia and now eight million strong, were driven into exile by persecution in Iran. Yet there are no international demands for Baha'i sovereignty.

Add to the equation the Circassians, the Sahrawis and a dozen other forgotten nations whose suffering provokes no demonstrations, no boycotts, no thunderous proclamations from Western parliaments. Their blood is too inconvenient.

But Palestine? That is different. Palestine has become the West's new crusade, its moral stage. Why? Because it offers something no other allegedly "oppressed" people can: the eternal scapegoat.

The reality, however, is more dishonest still. This is not about justice for Palestinians; it is about Europe's own domestic desperation. The inner affairs of Britain, France, Spain and Portugal are in flames. Their societies are imploding under a cocktail of economic and housing crises, uncontrolled migration, collapsing public safety, social unrest, and the growing influence of radical Islam and the far left. What better way to pacify the restless streets than to throw Israel onto the pyre?

This is the oldest trick in history. When your house is on fire, find a scapegoat. And in Europe, as ever, the scapegoat is the Jew.

The recognition of Palestine is not a diplomatic achievement; it is appeasement, a pacifier tossed to angry mobs waving foreign symbols in foreign tongues.

If your country displays more flags of a country that does not exist than of your own, then something is profoundly wrong with your country. If your newspapers feature Jews on the front page every day, then your moral compass has been deliberately shattered.

Think about it: The war in Gaza is the best thing that could have happened to someone like Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia's war in Ukraine has a death toll on a magnitude higher than the combined casualties of the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict throughout history. Yet the West has shifted its outrage to a spectacle that costs it nothing. Ukrainians are learning, brutally, what the Jews have always known: Their suffering will never be enough to hold the world's attention when the promise of blaming Israel is on the table.

And so, the lie is maintained: that recognition of Palestine is an act of justice. It is not. It is an act of cowardice, an act of surrender, an act of distraction. It rewards those who failed to destroy Israel by violence with the gift of international legitimacy. It tells every forgotten nation—the Kurds, Druze, Assyrians, Yazidis, Baha'i—that their oppression is irrelevant unless it can be pinned on the Jews.

This is the true obscenity.

Human rights are either for everyone or for no one. And today, they are for no one. They have been reduced to a political weapon, stripped of universality, prostituted to the cause of convenience.

The recognition of Palestine is not the end of hypocrisy; it is its triumph. It reveals Western democracies not as defenders of principle but as hollow states too weak to face their own crises, too cynical to admit their own failures and too eager to sacrifice Jews, yet again, to buy temporary calm on the home front.

The question that remains is not whether or not Palestine deserves recognition, but whether the West can still call itself a civilization when its principles are so cheaply sold, its morality so easily corrupted, and scapegoats are so predictably chosen.

Every time that Europe has chosen the Jew as scapegoat, it has eventually destroyed itself. What begins with Jews never ends with Jews. Today, it is Israel; tomorrow, it will be Europe's own societies, consumed by the very flames they themselves have lit.

And then, there will be no human rights left, even to pretend.

(JNS Oct 23)

A Tale of Two 'Conceptziot' By Josh Warhit

Fifty years apart, two disasters in Israel are bound by the same Hebrew word: conceptzia. Following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the term became shorthand for the conceptual failure that enabled Egypt and Syria to launch their joint surprise attack against the Jewish state.

Translating to something between "governing assumption" and "preconceived notion," it regained prominence in local vernacular following Hamas's invasion of southern Israel five decades later.

Since Oct. 7, 2023, conceptzia has become a polemical catch-all for blame over the calamity. This broad use of the term has created the impression that there was a single overarching conceptzia, with disagreements reduced to who was ensnared in it. But in truth, there were two.

The first conceptzia belonged to the generals, intelligence chiefs and other senior figures across the security establishment, who believed that Hamas was sufficiently deterred and uninterested in fighting. This was not a passive misreading of the enemy, but a delusion born of arrogance, negligence, and willful blindness.

Worse yet, rather than treating their belief with caution, these officials bet our children's lives and our national sovereignty on the conviction that Hamas would not dare mount a full-scale assault.

The second conceptzia was a function of the first. It was the belief not that Hamas was deterred, but that Israel's security apparatus would never be so negligent as to stop guarding the country altogether. That they would never bet our lives on their own perceptions of the enemy. That whatever their politics, they would never be so reckless as to abandon the basic duty of defense. That they were, at the very least, doing their jobs.

This second conceptzia was no less incorrect than the first, but it was certainly more understandable, even in hindsight. It was shared by most of the Israeli public because it reflected the baseline assumption any society must maintain with respect to its military—that those entrusted to guard the state are actually guarding it.

It is this second conceptzia to which Israel's political echelon had succumbed in the lead-up to Oct. 7. Any prime minister, however skeptical of his generals, must operate on the premise that the security apparatus is fulfilling its most basic duty.

A prime minister cannot personally interrogate every intelligence report or oversee every unit in the field; he has to govern on the basis that those charged with defense are carrying it out. Otherwise, no government would be able to function.

Of course, the political echelon has a responsibility to scrutinize the security establishment. And to be sure, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at times echoed the defense establishment's language about Hamas being deterred.

But there's a meaningful difference between acknowledging

deterrence as a temporary condition—wrong as even that may have been—and enshrining it as a permanent truth, divorced from contingency.

It was the military that did the latter, sanctifying its assessment and treating it as a license to lower its guard. The generals continuously and emphatically insisted that they had Gaza under control—that even a fly could not move in the Strip without them knowing in real time. It was this illusion that inspired the national policy of "managing" Gaza with the help of Qatari cash.

What we learned on Oct. 7 is that the defense establishment was not merely less competent than it should have been. Remarkably, it was less rooted in reality than the average citizen. It would have been troubling enough if climbing the ranks produced only modest gains in awareness of the enemy. What we discovered instead is that advancement required possessing (or adopting) a mentality that made commanders less aware. The higher they climbed, the more misinformed they became.

This is not to suggest that the problem was stupidity. Far from it – what the generals weaponized for their own self-deception was none other than intellect itself. Smart people have a marked tendency to reinforce their own pre-existing beliefs. Since some of those beliefs will inevitably be wrong, smart people end up entrenching egregious assumptions with a high degree of confidence.

The generals' self-deception spawned their own conceptzia and, in turn, the public's. But these two governing assumptions do not carry equal weight. One was the product of the arrogance of the unelected, who forsook their mission and left the country and its citizens unprotected. The other arose from the misplaced trust that the people and the elected leadership placed in the aforementioned unelected.

Both conceptziot collapsed on Oct. 7, but only one amounts to betrayal. (JNS Oct 20)

Hamas Must Be Destroyed, and Only Israel has the Guts to Do It

By Mark Levin

If the last few days have demonstrated anything, it's that Hamas must be defeated militarily and that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needs to be unobstructed so he can finish the job.

Netanyahu is being attacked by the left and right in Israel for agreeing to the peace deal brokered by U.S. President Donald Trump. Hamas has violated the terms of Phase 2 of the peace plan repeatedly. It was never intended to be so amorphous as to allow Hamas to do as it pleases, yet Israel is pressured and forced to relent rather than take care of business.

Meanwhile, Hamas is slaughtering any and all opposition, which would be needed to change the trajectory of the Gaza Strip.

And what is Qatar—Hamas's heavily funded terrorist militia group—doing? Its emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, just libeled Israel in the worst way with vile accusations, essentially demanding Israel's elimination. Yet Qatar, Turkey and Egypt are supposed to be disarming and removing Hamas, along with other Arab and Muslim countries. Obviously, they are not.

We have a delegation in Israel now that is pressuring Israel. I base this on the anonymous leaks I am reading in the media, which have been planted there. What exactly is Israel supposed to do? Commit suicide?

That is not going to happen.

We talk about obliterating Hamas, yet we are pressuring Israel. Pressuring Israel will not stop Hamas. Pressuring Qatar, Turkey and Egypt, as well as Hamas, is what should be done. That said, those countries have shown they won't take real steps to stop Hamas.

Hamas must be wiped out. They don't get infinite chances to comply. We won't wipe them out. Only Israel will. It's time to accept reality, stop pressuring Israel, and let them finish the job. For their sake and the sake of the West, and, yes, the Arab Gulf states that want Hamas eliminated but don't have the guts to say so.

(JNS Oct 21)

How the Muslim Brotherhood Built a Media Empire

By Mariam Wahba

Millions of phone screens across the Arab world light up every day with the same messages. The Muslim Brotherhood is a victim of brutal regimes, they say. Secular governments are traitors to their own people. Hamas is a legitimate resistance movement.

The outlets vary—TV shows, YouTube channels, X accounts, podcasts, and online magazines—but the messages remain the same.

Since its founding in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has evolved into a vast network of chapters and offshoots that operate autonomously. Though each has faced periods of both repression and resurgence, the movement has preserved and enhanced its ability to control the public narrative and spread its message. Today its media empire is diverse, diffuse, and pervasive, with no single mastermind or headquarters. The group's ideology moves across borders through a web of seemingly uncoordinated but deeply connected channels. Together, they speak in one voice, infecting generations of Arab minds with the group's Islamist doctrine. "Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope" is one of its slogans.

The Trump administration is currently said to be preparing to designate several of the group's chapters as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), something that could happen as early as Wednesday. Yet this discussion remains narrowly fixated on political structures and leaders, overlooking a pillar of the group's survival: its seductive and deadly message.

That is why, even as the Brotherhood remains politically marginalized or even outlawed across much of the Arab world, its message still flows into millions of homes. While the group's ideas have been forced off ballots and out of parliaments, they never left the public conversation.

The Brotherhood has long understood that media is not merely an accessory to its politics. Rather, it is the primary vehicle for spreading its message and winning supporters. In the 1930s, Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna distributed tracts and pamphlets to spread his ideology. By the 1950s, the Brotherhood was running magazines like *Al Dawa* to cultivate support. In the 2010s, it launched satellite TV stations and party newspapers. When the Brotherhood lost power in 2013 after briefly holding Egypt's presidency following the Arab Spring, it doubled down on broadcasting from exile. Today, its empire spans satellite television, sites like IkhwanWeb, and a dense web of social media accounts that keep its message polished and ever-present.

At the heart of this machine is Mekameleen TV. A satellite station founded in Turkey in the mid-2010s, its very name, "We Will Continue," reflects the Brotherhood's determination to endure after being toppled in Egypt. In April 2022, when Cairo pressured Ankara to curb Brotherhood activity in Turkey as part of their rapprochement, Mekameleen vanished. A month later, the channel resurfaced, broadcasting from European cities. As one presenter explained, the channel would operate from places "not subject to pressure from Egyptian or Gulf authorities." Like the Brotherhood itself, its media apparatus adapts to survive. Now deeply embedded in major European cities, these media hubs sit within a wider Brotherhood ecosystem, where large, often violent pro-Hamas protests underscore ongoing efforts to radicalize.

Mekameleen, like other Brotherhood-affiliated media outposts, goes to great lengths to obscure formal ownership or direct control. It leaves no paper trail tying it to Brotherhood leadership. This deliberate ambiguity allows it to broadcast from foreign jurisdictions without fear of sanctions or shutdown.

But organizational charts are not the only way to establish affiliation.

The content speaks for itself. The Brotherhood's fingerprints are everywhere: programming that glorifies leaders like former Egyptian president and Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi, portrays the Brotherhood as a perpetual victim of repression, and gives unfiltered airtime to its political allies, including Hamas.

For all its considerable reach, Mekameleen is only one node in a much larger machine. Alongside it are satellite channels like Al-Yarmouk TV and Watan, and digital channels like MaydanEG25, each pumping out a steady flow of Islamist commentary. Its hosts traffic in antisemitic conspiracy theories, vilify secular governments, and present the Brotherhood's ideology as the Arab world's rightful and inevitable future.

In August, Mekameleen hosted Osama Abu Irshaid, the executive director of American Muslims for Palestine (AMP), for a segment

framed as political analysis on the "Arab uprising. . . against the genocide in Gaza." Abu Irshaid is a longtime Hamas defender, as is the organization he leads. AMP is widely alleged to be the successor to the Holy Land Foundation, which was convicted in a Dallas federal court in 2008 of providing material support to Hamas. AMP itself is currently under Senate investigation for its Hamas ties.

Especially after its October 7, 2023 attack on Israel that left more than 1,200 dead and 251 taken hostage, Hamas, which is the Brotherhood's offshoot in Gaza, has been a key beneficiary of this media ecosystem.

The Brotherhood feeds on X and YouTube have churned out clips framing Hamas's October 7 atrocities as legitimate "resistance," denouncing Israeli operations in Gaza as "extermination," and smearing Arab governments that oppose Hamas as "traitors to Palestine." Other posts have lionized Hamas spokesmen, repeated unverified casualty claims from Hamas-run ministries, and presented Hamas's cause as the authentic voice of the Arab world.

Since its founding, Hamas has long drawn on its parent group's ideology. Its 1988 charter calls for Israel's destruction and the killing of Jews, and Brotherhood-affiliated outlets have, for decades, amplified Hamas's message, ensuring that the ideological pipeline remains intact. Even when the Brotherhood was driven underground in Egypt in the 1950s, Gaza remained a safe harbor where future Hamas leaders absorbed Brotherhood teachings. That dynamic persists today, with channels like Mekameleen sustaining Hamas's messaging and ensuring its narratives circulate widely.

And then there's Al Jazeera. The Qatar-owned Al Jazeera media network is not formally part of the Brotherhood, yet it has long amplified the movement's message and ideology. Since its founding in 1996, Al Jazeera has consistently given airtime to Brotherhood voices, framing events through the organization's lens.

One of its earliest and most influential programs was al-Sharia wa al-Hayah, or Sharia and Life, hosted by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a leading Muslim Brotherhood scholar and disciple of Brotherhood founder al-Banna. The show aired for 17 years. Each week, Qaradawi used the network's platform to encourage suicide bombing, issue fatwas authorizing attacks on Jews, and preach Islamist doctrine to millions across the world.

After the Muslim Brotherhood was toppled in Egypt in 2013, Brotherhood members forced to flee to Qatar were hosted by Al Jazeera. In fact, several exiles lived in hotel suites paid for by the network. Later that summer, an Al Jazeera English presenter was taken off the air and reprimanded after pressing a Brotherhood spokesperson on why women and children were kept at demonstrations when they were certain to be targeted by security forces.

Former Al Jazeera journalist Adnan al-Ameri explained: "When you work for their news channel, they need you to promote their Muslim Brotherhood agendas, and if you're not there ideologically, they'll make sure to buy you off."

In its broader coverage, Al Jazeera legitimizes the Brotherhood's worldview, presents its leaders as credible political actors, and smears regimes that oppose them as corrupt or illegitimate.

Mere hours after the October 7 attack, Al Jazeera aired a recording of Hamas military chief Mohammad Deif encouraging Palestinians to "kill, burn, destroy, and shut down roads" in Israel with "cleaver axe, Molotov cocktail, truck, tractor, or car."

For the Brotherhood, this inchoate media empire is an instrument of the movement, designed to amplify Islamist ideology, sustain its networks in exile, and project influence far beyond where its political chapters may be. Taken together, they form a digital echo chamber that ensures Islamist narratives permeate online discourse across the Arab world.

When the administration designates the Muslim Brotherhood's most dangerous branches as terrorist organizations, it must not overlook the ecosystem that sustains them: its media outlets. To ignore these networks would be to leave the group's most effective weapon untouched.

Washington and European partners must scrutinize the Brotherhood's media ecosystems, tracing how its channels, websites, and accounts support its branches. Those that cross the line into material backing should face the appropriate sanctions and designations. If Washington is serious about confronting the Brotherhood, it must target this media empire. Anything less leaves the job unfinished. (The Free Press Oct 20)