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ISRAEL NEWS

*A collection of the week's news from Israel
From the Bet El Twinning / Israel Action Committee of
Beth Avraham Yoseph of Toronto Congregation*

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel inadvertently confirmed this near-total dependence on foreign governments. Passage of the Nonprofit Law, it said, could lead to the "literal collapse of dozens and perhaps hundreds of

Commentary...

Israel's Foreign-Funded NGOs Undermine its Sovereignty

By Lawrence Solomon

To fulfil their vision of how Israel should conduct its affairs and eventually arrive at a two-state solution, many Western countries actively interfere in Israeli politics. They do so directly through diplomatic channels and indirectly by funding Israeli NGOs that agree with their agenda.

Western governments and the NGOs they've enlisted have engaged in everything from aiding and abetting the construction of illegal Bedouin settlements to destroying archaeological discoveries that prove the Jews are Israel's indigenous people.

More recently, this government-NGO nexus has rejected and protested against the Netanyahu government's proposed judicial reforms. U.S. President Joe Biden has gone so far as to condition American support for Israeli-Saudi normalization on this purely domestic issue.

The current Israeli government rightly views all this as a threat to its sovereignty. Thus, it recently introduced the Nonprofits Law, a bill that would curb foreigners' ability to exploit Israeli NGOs by taxing 65% of the NGOs' foreign receipts.

Western countries, naturally, have violently objected to the bill. Following the swift eruption of outrage, the Netanyahu government caved and shelved the bill.

The governments that objected to the Nonprofits Law claim to be acting in Israel's best interests. They assert that they are protecting Israeli civil society and thus Israel's democracy.

"A vital and strong civil society is crucial for every democracy," tweeted Sweden's Ambassador to Israel Erik Ullenhag. He claimed, "The draft bill on NGO taxation would severely limit Israeli civil society." The French, Dutch, Norwegian, Danish, Irish and Belgian embassies in Israel echoed this ostensible concern for Israel's civil society.

These governments and their representatives in Israel have it backwards. The Nonprofits Law, which would have limited only that portion of civil society funded by foreign governments, would have bolstered, not weakened, Israel's civil society.

Civil society, by definition, excludes government actors. It is defined as a "third sector," separate from government and business. It is intended to act as a check on both. By pumping hundreds of millions of dollars into left-leaning NGOs that represent a small proportion of Israeli society, foreign governments are effectively inflating the influence of foreign-funded NGOs at the expense of domestically funded NGOs. This undermines Israel's home-grown civil society.

In much of the West, NGOs have long since ceased to be independent of governments. They are now effectively agents of those governments and are sometimes called GONGOs—"government-organized non-governmental organizations." GONGOs are set up or sponsored by governments in order to further those governments' political interests. This is, at best, an empty mimicry of civil society.

Many of Israel's foreign-funded NGOs are GONGOs. While the leaders of some Israeli NGOs are in complete agreement with their foreign paymasters, it is likely that others are reluctant participants. They need to reorder their priorities and adapt their policies in order to meet the demands of their foreign paymasters.

Such manipulation is very widespread in Israel. As noted by Kerem Navot, an organization that monitors and researches Israeli land policy in Judea and Samaria, foreign governments provide the vast majority of funding for left-wing NGOs.

NGOs that defy their funders face extinction and the loss of their employees' livelihoods. Thus, as a practical matter, most have no choice but to do what they're told.

NGOs."

From the perspective of Israelis who want Israeli policies to be based on the views of Israelis, this proves that hundreds of Israeli NGOs are doing the bidding of foreign governments. These NGOs are, in effect, a Trojan Horse.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu failed in his latest effort to curb foreign funding of NGOs, just as he failed in his 2017 attempt to ban all such foreign funding. But as long as he aspires for Israel to be a full-fledged sovereign state, he should not stop trying. (JNS May 30)

Beat Iran at its Own Game By Jason Shvili

Israel and Iran are a good distance from each other, yet the Islamic Republic is right on Israel's doorstep and has been for some time now. Its proxies, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, sit on Israel's northern and southern borders respectively. For more than a decade, Iran has also been trying to get a foothold on Israel's border with Syria. To make a long story short, Iran has Israel nearly surrounded even though the two countries are more than a thousand miles from each other.

Iran has managed to gain footholds on Israel's borders by taking advantage of the fact that the Jewish state still has enemies on some of its frontiers—Syria, Lebanon and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. In contrast, Iran is not surrounded by enemies. But it does have enemies in the region. In fact, many of Iran's enemies are within its own borders in the form of several ethnic minorities.

The Islamic republic is far from a homogenous country. Although Persians are the dominant ethnic group, there are numerous other ethnicities in Iran, including Azeris, Arabs, Baluchis and Kurds. These are groups of people who would be more than happy to be free of the Iranian state, which has severely persecuted them for decades, even before the 1979 Islamic revolution.

As Iran takes advantage of Israel's enemies, Israel should respond by taking advantage of Iran's enemies by forging alliances with the Islamic republic's oppressed ethnic groups. Israel would do well to support these groups' struggles for self-determination by providing any kind of support it can, up to and including military aid. By doing this, Israel can establish footholds not just on Iran's borders, but within Iran itself.

Israel should begin by strengthening relations with the Kurds. I say strengthen because Israel has had cordial though clandestine relations with the Kurds for a long time. The Kurds are particularly important because they straddle the borders of Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Thus, strengthening relations with the Kurds has the potential to allow Israel to have eyes in all four of these countries.

The Kurds are also the largest ethnic group in the Middle East without a country of their own. They of all people deserve self-determination and Israel can help make that happen. In exchange, the Kurds should allow Israel to put intelligence and military assets in their territory to target Iran.

In fact, there are indications that this may have already occurred. Earlier this year, news emerged that Israel supposedly has a secret base in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq. Whether or not it's true is up for debate. But if it is true, then Israel is already on the right track.

The next step would ideally be for Israel to extend its hand to other oppressed minority groups in Iran and give them any support possible—moral, financial, military, etc.—to help them gain their independence from the Islamic republic in exchange for allowing the Jewish state to base intelligence and military assets in their territory. After all, if Iran can play the proxy game, so can Israel. (Israel Hayom May 29)

The Farhud and the Palestinian ‘Cause’ By Lyn Julius

Have you heard of the Farhud? Chances are you haven't. This anti-Jewish massacre—Farhud means “forced dispossession” in Arabic—took place 82 years ago this week in Iraq. Yet a recent poll found that only 7% of Israelis have heard about it.

On June 1-2, 1941, at least 180 Jews were murdered in Baghdad and Basra—the figure could have been as many as 600—2,000 were wounded and 900 homes and 586 Jewish-owned businesses were destroyed. There was looting, rape and mutilation. Stories abound of babies murdered and Jewish hospital patients being refused treatment or poisoned. The dead were hurriedly buried in a mass grave.

The Farhud sounded the death knell for the ancient Jewish community of Iraq. More “Farhuds” decimated other Jewish communities in Arab countries, leading to a mass exodus. Most of these Jews fled to Israel, where they and their descendants comprise over half the Jewish population.

Besides the general ignorance of the Farhud, the Palestinian role in it is almost unknown. In fact, the infamous Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, helped lay the groundwork for the massacre.

The Farhud, in other words, was proof that anti-Zionist “resistance” to the Jews of Palestine had spilled over into unabashed antisemitism directed against the Jews of the Arab world.

The Mufti himself spent two years in Iraq beginning in 1939. He arrived with 400 Syrians and Palestinians, most of them teachers. In April 1941, the Mufti backed a pro-Nazi coup led by Rashid Ali al-Gilani and four military officers. Theirs was the only Arab regime to sign a treaty with Nazi Germany.

Throughout the Middle East, Arab public opinion was mostly pro-German. A poll carried out on behalf of the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem in Feb. 1941 found that 88% of Palestinian Arabs wanted the Nazis to win the war.

Although the pro-Nazi government in Iraq was defeated and the ringleaders put to flight, the Mufti escaped to Berlin, where he became Hitler's lavishly-funded wartime guest. The Mufti enjoyed an entourage of 60 Arab exiles and pumped out poisonous propaganda from the shortwave Radio Berlin transmitter at Zeesen, fusing anti-Jewish verses from the Quran with contemporary antisemitic conspiracy theories. “Kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases God, history and religion,” he exhorted over the airwaves.

At a meeting with Hitler in Nov. 1941, the Mufti pledged to help the Nazis win the war and demanded that he be allowed to manage the extermination of the Jews within his sphere of influence.

The Mufti's collaboration with the Nazis, despite strenuous Arab efforts to downplay it, is well-documented. During his stay in Berlin, he met all the senior Nazis: Himmler, Goebbels and Eichmann among them.

His overall contribution to the Nazi cause was twofold. In order to stop Jews from fleeing to Palestine, he persuaded the Nazis to abandon their plans to expel the Jews of Europe. Given Nazi ideology, once the expulsion option was abandoned, the only thing to be done with the Jews was to exterminate them. The Mufti also set up SS units of Muslim troops in Bosnia and Albania, who committed terrible atrocities.

The Mufti was, according to the scholar Matthias Kuentzel, the point of convergence between the Nazis' great war against the Jews and the Arabs' small war against the Jewish community of Palestine. The Mufti's top military commanders in the small war against the Jews were Fawzi al-Qawuqji, Abdel Qader al-Husseini and Hassan Salama. They had all been Nazi collaborators. There are reports that Palestinian Arab forces had ex-Nazi advisers in the field.

The Mufti was, for various realpolitik reasons, never tried at Nuremberg. This meant that, unlike in Europe, Nazi-inspired antisemitism was never discredited in the Arab and Muslim world. In fact, Egypt and Syria became havens for Nazi war criminals.

The postwar influence of ex-Nazis in Cairo was a contributing factor in extending the Arabs' ideological, territorial and race war against Israel into the 1950s and beyond. Adolf Eichmann, for example, saw the Muslim world's war on Israel as a continuation of the Nazi struggle against the Jews. “I have not managed to complete the task of total annihilation of the Jews, but I hope that the Muslims will complete it for me,” he wrote in his memoirs.

The Arab League, founded in 1945, was filled with ex-Axis collaborators. Abdel Rahman Azzam, its first secretary-general, was one of the Mufti's agents who had worked with the Nazis. He promised “a war of extermination not seen since the Mongolian massacres” if a Jewish state were established. Indeed, the Mufti-

inspired charter of the Arab League would soon form the basis of the League's declaration of a war of annihilation on the nascent State of Israel in 1948.

A byproduct of the Arabs' failure to win the small war against the Jews and their new state was the mass ethnic cleansing of almost a million Jews from Arab countries. Early on, Arab League states drafted antisemitic decrees eerily reminiscent of the Nazis' Nuremberg laws, stripping Jews of their rights and stealing their property.

What, you might ask, has the Mufti got to do with the Palestinians of today? While several Arab states have made peace with Israel, the “moderate” leadership of the Palestinian Authority remains determined to continue the Mufti's tradition of total war against Israel.

In his recent speech to the U.N. marking the 75th anniversary of the nakba—the derogatory Palestinian term for Israel's creation—P.A. chief Mahmoud Abbas, whose doctoral thesis denied the Holocaust, did not attempt to disguise his eliminationist aims with talk of a “two-state solution” or withdrawal from post-1967 settlements. Israel must be thrown out of the U.N., he said. It has no place or history in the Middle East.

Abbas's call for the return of Palestinian Arab refugees would, at best, turn the Jews of Israel into a subjugated minority under Arab rule.

It is clear that the spirit of the Farhud still hovers over the Palestinian “cause.” (JNS May 31)

Arms Smuggling from Jordan: Lessons Learned

By Yossi Kuperwasser

Jordanian Parliament member Imad al-Adwan was arrested on April 23 at the Allenby Bridge while trying to smuggle some 200 weapons into the West Bank—and perhaps beyond, into Israel. He was quickly released after questioning and sent back to Jordan. The episode was pushed out of the headlines but deserves an in-depth look.

The Israeli investigation revealed that al-Adwan had carried out 12 separate smuggling attempts since early 2022, according to the Arab News. Presumably, answers to the questions raised by the affair are already in the hands of al-Adwan's interrogators in the Israeli Security Agency and Jordanian intelligence, but the phenomenon creates concern.

Al-Adwan is not the only major smuggler. According to Israel Defense Forces figures, during 2020-2021 some 1,600 smuggling attempts from Jordan were interdicted, and in the first months of 2023, several hundred weapons were seized in other attempts. It is reasonable to assume that this may be just the tip of the iceberg; only 10% of al-Adwan's attempts were detected.

The Palestinian demand for weapons is great, and Jordan has a large supply, resulting in mutual motivation to engage in the trade. Israel and Jordan's efforts and counterterror activity have not deterred the smuggling.

A nagging question is, for whom are the caches of weapons from Jordan intended? Reasonable suspects are terrorist elements and criminal organizations.

It is also possible, even likely, that some of the weapons are intended for Hamas and various elements in Fatah, to build their capabilities to compete for control after the current Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas exits the scene. The entire Palestinian system is in suspense for that moment of truth.

Given that al-Adwan is allegedly a “problematic” member of parliament, from a faction affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is the Palestinian sister, it is possible his motives went beyond profit. Was he also exploiting his status and immunity to build Hamas's power ahead of the decisive junction?

Israel's Arab residents also seek weapons to combat criminal gangs and wage clan wars. Murders among Israel's Arab population are increasing at an alarming rate. The shootouts and disorder may serve the purposes of external adversaries looking to destabilize the country.

Some important lessons emerge from the al-Adwan affair: First, the assumption that the Jordanian government is vigilant with regard to arms smuggling, and to the security of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, is doubtful.

The hypothesis that had the Jordanians known about the smuggling they would have stopped it remains in question. Jordan's

ability appears limited, possibly due to insufficient intelligence penetration into the illicit enterprise or because closing down smuggling is not a priority since it does not directly threaten the regime. It is also possible that the Jordanians do not want to be portrayed at home as Israel's defenders, and when they have relevant information, prefer to pass it to Israel.

Any lacuna in intelligence gathering is worrisome. Considering the hostile atmosphere to Israel that characterizes the Jordanian street today and concerns over Iranian entreaties to Sunni regimes, an inability to obtain information is problematic. Moreover, it could project on the stability of the regime itself, which is already confronting growing domestic challenges.

A second lesson from the al-Adwan affair relates to Israel's eastern border. The claim that Israel's security no longer requires military and intelligence control over Judea, Samaria and the Jordan Valley, including a military presence in vital areas and control of the crossings and the Jordan Valley "in its broadest sense" (as Rabin said in the Knesset in October 1995) has proven erroneous.

This claim was the basis of the security component of President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry's peace proposals (i.e., General Allen's security plan). The lessons of the smuggling and the security threats from Palestinian enclaves prove Israel's well-considered rejection of the U.S. notions.

What should be done about the arms smuggling? First, Israel must process the lessons, increase its capacity to deal with the phenomenon and thwart it on its own. This should be done through increased intelligence and operational efforts and by strengthening deterrence with harsher punishments.

Unfortunately, the quick release of the Jordanian parliamentarian to his home country, notwithstanding serious political considerations, did not contribute to this context. Second, Israel needs to increase cooperation with Jordan against the scourge of smuggling and demand that Jordan increase its efforts, which are also necessary to strengthen its own security.

Ostensibly, the P.A. and its security forces are possible interlocutors on the issue, but in practice, the chances that they will earnestly work to thwart arms smuggling are meager.

Finally, the efforts must be intensified to damage the terrorist infrastructure in the P.A. territories and confiscate the weapons in the possession of terrorist operatives there.
(Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs May 31)

'The Kiss of Biden' and Erdogan's Reelection By Michael Doran

Pity Kemal Kilicdaroglu. The Turkish opposition candidate faced an impossible challenge: running for president with American lipstick on his cheek.

Call it the kiss of Biden. In 2020, when Joe Biden was a candidate for president, he told the editorial board of the New York Times that he favored working with "elements of the Turkish leadership" to "embolden them...to take on and defeat [President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan."

If there is one thing Erdogan knows, it's how to use the hostility of foreigners for political gain. By appealing to the profound patriotism of the Turkish electorate, he turned the kiss that voters perceived President Biden to be giving to Kilicdaroglu into a kiss of death. "Biden gave the order to topple [me]," Erdogan said last Saturday, the day before the election. "The ballots tomorrow will also give an answer to Biden," he continued.

A series of blunders by Kilicdaroglu helped Erdogan further build the case that his opponent was Biden's beloved. First among these was the tacit alliance that Kilicdaroglu made with the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), a Kurdish party which mainstream Turkish nationalists regard as a bastion of thinly veiled support for the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the terrorist organization that seeks to crack up Turkey and turn its eastern provinces into an independent Kurdish state. The number of voters whom Kilicdaroglu attracted by courting the HDP failed to offset the number of Turkish nationalists who recoiled from the courtship.

Patriotic Turks abhor not just the PKK but also the relationship that the United States has developed with the terrorist organization, through its Syrian wing, the People's Protection Units, also known as the YPG. Erdogan cast Kilicdaroglu's alignment with the HDP and his eagerness to ingratiate himself with the Biden administration as the twin elements of an anti-nationalist agenda. Kilicdaroglu, Erdogan

explained, knew nothing of statesmanship. The only way to counter America's pro-PKK orientation was by balancing between Washington and Moscow, a task that required experience, judgment, and grit—qualities, Erdogan implied, that the opposition leader was lacking.

In answer to this argument, Kilicdaroglu proposed an alternative balancing act: between Washington and Beijing. To this end, he announced a major initiative, his "Turkic Silk Road," an economic and transport corridor between Turkey and China that would strengthen the ties between Ankara and the Central Asian Turkic states. "Neither West nor East, this is the way of the Turk," he said in a video presentation.

Kilicdaroglu was obviously trying to counter the perception that he was America's stooge. The idea, presumably, was to showcase himself simultaneously as a real alternative and yet every bit Erdogan's equal as a champion of an independent and self-reliant Turkey. But the effort backfired. Once again, Kilicdaroglu managed only to alienate potential supporters. This time his blunder was to bypass Azerbaijan. His planned corridor would have linked up with China through Iran instead.

Turks feel closer to Azerbaijanis than to any other foreign people. Moreover, since the Second Karabakh War in 2020, the alliance with Azerbaijan (which is also a strategic ally of Israel) has become a key pillar of Turkish national security policy. Among regular voters and national security professionals alike, therefore, Kilicdaroglu's big idea of a Silk Road was a dud. It merely confirmed Erdogan's insinuation that he was a foreign policy lightweight who was not up to the job.

In addition to exhibiting a pro-China inclination, the Silk Road initiative also revealed a pronounced yet unacknowledged pro-Iran bias. These aspects of Kilicdaroglu's campaign, if implemented, would have harmed the interests of the United States and Israel. Observers in Washington and Jerusalem, however, glossed over them, preferring to conceive of Kilicdaroglu merely as "not-Erdogan," as the antidote to what they erroneously claim is the Turkish president's abiding flaw, namely, his Islamism.

While turning a blind eye to Kilicdaroglu's obvious inadequacies, this line of analysis also downplayed the fact that Erdogan normalized relations last year with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel. These states are staunch enemies of Islamism, and Erdogan's bad relations with them were the result, we were once told, of his supposedly deep and abiding commitment to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Bye, bye, Turkish Islamism. We have entered a new era. In this election, nationalism and national security predominated. The recent achievements of Turkey's defense industrial base, not headscarves and religious schooling, were at the epicenter of Erdogan's winning campaign.

After evaluating the entirety of his track record, it's clear that Erdogan rightfully belongs to a group of leaders that includes India's Modi, Hungary's Orban, and yes, Israel's Netanyahu. The Western press habitually describes these men as "authoritarian" and "extremist," but hostility to democracy is hardly their defining attribute. They are more adept at mobilizing votes than almost any of their contemporaries. They do so by defending national traditions and values, which, in the eyes of their supporters, are under attack from internationalist elites. In Turkey, as in Hungary, India and Israel, the line between "conservative" and "religious" is fuzzy. These leaders represent, in short, a popular conservative nationalism.

Although "nationalist" is a more accurate label than "Islamist," it, too, is overly simplistic. Turkey is bigger than Erdogan. He has managed to tower over Turkish politics for more than two decades, not because he has imposed a uniform ideology on this large and diverse country, but because he has convinced his core political supporters that he remains loyal to them while simultaneously showing himself to be pragmatic, transactional and capable of breathtaking feats of compartmentalization.

Erdogan is both a committed nationalist and a master of realpolitik. Instead of lamenting his victory, Washington and Jerusalem should focus on the opportunities that having a talented and experienced leader in charge of such a powerful country can offer. By shunning him, the United States and Israel ignore Turkey itself—and they do so at their peril.

(The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune May 31)

Asking the Wrong Question About Biden's Flawed Anti-Semitism Plan

By Jonathan S. Tobin

You've got to hand it to the current occupants of the West Wing. President Joe Biden's administration has shown itself to be weak and confused about a lot of important issues. But when it comes to manipulating American Jews, they know exactly what they're doing.

After teasing it for weeks, the White House's unveiling of the "U.S. National Strategy to Counter Antisemitism," last week was a public-relations triumph in more ways than one. It was released just hours before the Jewish holiday of Shavuot and the Memorial Day weekend. Much like the traditional DC Friday-afternoon news dump in which officials release something just as everyone stops paying attention to headlines, this helped the White House manage reactions. With the Jewish world about to be shut down for two days—and then everyone else for two days after that—administration shills succeeded in dominating the conversation about the document.

More than that, the unveiling was a textbook example of how exceeding low expectations can generate positive spin. It also led to a discussion that avoided the most important question that should have been raised. Instead, the Jews were debating how happy they should be about Biden's gesture.

For weeks, Jewish groups had feared that the document would not be rooted in the working definition of antisemitism established by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). Among other points, this definition states that denying Jews the right to self-determination and claiming that Israel is a racist endeavor are antisemitic.

This is why the intersectional left—which promotes the lie that, in accordance with the precepts of critical race theory, the Palestinian war on Israel's existence is morally equivalent to the struggle for civil rights in the United States—opposes the IHRA definition. And given that faction's increasing influence within the Democratic Party, the rumors emanating from the White House that the antisemitism strategy would treat the IHRA definition as no more valid than others put forward by anti-Zionists that give a free pass to hatred of Israel, those fears seemed valid.

So, it was not surprising that when the document was unveiled and it turned out the IHRA definition was embraced by it, the sighs of relief and hosannas for the wisdom of Biden were far louder than they would have otherwise been.

Indeed, the gratitude of the organized Jewish world was so great that with only a few honorable exceptions, almost all of the groups that purport to represent Jews were inclined to ignore or downplay the fact that elsewhere in the 60-page document (filled with governmental boilerplate text and pious expressions of righteous opposition to prejudice) was language that "welcomes and appreciates the Nexus Document."

The Nexus Document's sole reason for existence is to provide an intellectual platform for the bogus claim that anti-Zionism is not antisemitic. Thus, it serves to legitimize a fast-growing form of Jew-hatred that—in contrast to the antisemitism of the far-right—has important support in the media, popular culture and the left wing of the Democratic Party. As such, the failure to define the term unequivocally flatly contradicts the IHRA definition and renders the entire exercise meaningless.

Indeed, amid the declarations of victory by mainstream Jewish groups, it must be conceded that the statement from J Street—which, while claiming to be Zionist, is an enabler and ally of anti-Zionists and pro-BDS groups—was far more accurate. J Street was correct to state that "the strategy avoids exclusively codifying any one specific, sweeping definition of antisemitism as the sole standard."

Mainstream Jewish groups were also silent about the fact that the Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR)—a group whose purpose is to promote anti-Zionism and hatred of Israel and which has provided crucial support for terrorists and antisemitism—was among the groups consulted by the document's authors.

Among the other obvious and disqualifying flaws in the document is its failure to call out by name any examples of antisemitism other than those associated with white supremacy and the far-right. This is in keeping with the administration's unwillingness to confront left-wing antisemitism, such as that of congressional "Squad" members Reps. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.) and Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.), who weeks earlier were honored guests at the White House, where they were

singled out for compliments by the president.

The document also lumps in antisemitism amid other forms of hate, specifically Islamophobia, a label most often falsely applied to groups that monitor the loud and frightening antisemitism that emanates from a Muslim community in which figures like Nation of Islam hatemonger Louis Farrakhan and extremist Islamist influencers drown out the voices of genuine moderates.

Yet so great was the appreciation of most of the organized Jewish world for the anodyne condemnations of antisemitism in the White House paper that most of those who commented on it were prepared to say that even if it wasn't perfect, it was still a historic step in the right direction.

Given the rising tide of antisemitism spreading across the globe, any step taken towards recognizing the problem was bound to be welcomed. And there is a lot within the strategy paper that is perfectly fine. But amid the eagerness to be pleased by the administration's efforts, those inclined to say that getting it mostly right was good enough also failed to comprehend that most of what it proposed was utterly without value.

The annual antisemitism threat assessment mentioned in the strategy might be of some use. This may also be true of improving hate-crimes data collection and a willingness to hold institutions accountable for tolerating antisemitism. The same cannot be said for the language about the need for more Holocaust education. It sounds nice, but if there is anything we should have learned in the last few decades, it is that focusing on the Holocaust, especially when most of these programs are intent on universalizing the Shoah rather than making clear how antisemitism operates and the specific menace it poses, does little or nothing to stop contemporary Jew-hatred.

Those who have sought to defend the strategy by accusing its critics of quibbling over details are not just demonstrating poor judgment. They are failing to ask the most important question about antisemitism in America. The real query that needs to be posed is what role this administration—even as it engages in a massive exercise in antisemitism virtue-signaling—plays in enabling the growth of a form of Jew-hatred that is considered acceptable in political discourse, academia and popular culture?

The unfortunate answer is quite a lot.

This is, after all, the same administration that has mandated the implementation of the new secular religion of diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) in every government department and agency.

The woke DEI catechism is rooted in critical race theory, which divides all Americans into two immutable groups: victims and victimizers. It is also directly connected to intersectional myths that treat Jews and Israel as white oppressors.

Biden's embrace of this toxic ideology and his decision to make it official government policy are among the most momentous things he has done in the White House. In comparison to that awful decision, the publication of a strategy paper on antisemitism is relatively insignificant. This was reflected in the largely negligible coverage of the document's unveiling in the secular media.

The Biden report did say that modules about antisemitism would be included in government DEI indoctrination. But anyone who thinks that this will temper the damage being done is forgetting that the DEI commissars who are implementing this doctrine of permanent race conflict throughout academia, the business world and now the government are exactly the same people who fought for the alternative to the IHRA definition. The only way to prevent the spread of this noxious form of left-wing Jew-hatred is to stop DEI, not to make minimal attempts to alter it.

The organized Jewish world was played perfectly by the Biden White House. As a result, the bulk of American Jewry—already inclined to support anything put out by the Democrats and to believe antisemitism is primarily a problem of the right—has had its pre-existing biases confirmed.

By allowing themselves to be distracted by a clever information operation and thereby gulled into avoiding a confrontation over the most important detail about the document, mainstream Jewish leadership has once again failed its constituency. An administration that is enabling antisemitism can't be trusted to fight antisemitism, no matter what its purported strategy on the issue might claim to be.

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