



ISRAEL NEWS
A collection of the week's news from Israel
From the Bet El Twinning / Israel Action Committee of
Beth Avraham Yoseph of Toronto Congregation

support for settlements, support for Israel, support for Zionism, and ordinary Jewish communal activity can quickly disappear.

What happens when a synagogue hosts an Israeli speaker? What happens when Jewish schools teach Zionism as

Commentary...

Senior Canadian Officials Seek to Isolate Israel – and Canada's Jewish Community

By Alan Kessel

On May 14, a group of former Canadian ambassadors and senior public servants sent Prime Minister Mark Carney an outrageous letter calling on Canada to impose sweeping diplomatic, economic, legal, and domestic measures against Israel.

The letter called for sanctions, suspension of bilateral agreements, support for international legal proceedings, and the review of charitable status for organizations connected to Israel or the Israel Defence Forces.

It deserves to be rejected outright.

It is morally unbalanced, strategically naïve, and profoundly disconnected from the reality Israel has faced since the Hamas terror attacks of October 7, 2023.

At its core, the letter asks Canadians to sit in judgment of a democratic ally fighting for its survival after suffering the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust – while applying standards of restraint and risk that no Canadian government would ever accept for its own citizens.

If Canadian towns had been invaded, families butchered in their homes, women raped, children murdered, civilians kidnapped, and rockets fired daily at our cities from multiple fronts, no serious person would expect Canada simply to absorb the attacks while being lectured from abroad about proportionality and restraint. Yet that is precisely the standard these former officials seek to impose on Israel.

The signatories present themselves as defenders of international law and peace. But their letter is built on a staggering imbalance. It places overwhelming emphasis on condemning Israel while treating Hamas and Hezbollah almost as secondary actors in a conflict they helped ignite and perpetuate.

The current war did not emerge in a vacuum. It began with the atrocities of October 7 and continues amid missile attacks, regional destabilization, and the ongoing role of Iranian-backed terrorist organizations openly committed to Israel's destruction.

Most astonishing of all is the silence surrounding the documented sexual atrocities committed during the October 7 attacks. The Israeli Commission on October 7th Crimes by Hamas Against Women, Children and Families has compiled extensive evidence and testimony concerning sexual and gender-based violence committed by Hamas and other Palestinian militants and civilians.

Yet the former diplomats who invoke human rights and international law somehow found no space in their letter even to acknowledge these crimes.

That omission is not minor. It is morally revealing.

The letter repeatedly invokes allegations of genocide and war crimes as though they are already established legal facts. They are not. International proceedings remain ongoing. Allegations are not judgments. But the signatories collapse those distinctions in order to create a narrative of unquestionable Israeli criminality demanding immediate punishment and isolation.

That is advocacy, not careful diplomacy.

And the punishment they propose is sweeping.

The letter calls for sanctions against Israeli officials, suspension of bilateral agreements, aggressive diplomatic pressure, and the use of Canadian domestic institutions – including the Canada Revenue Agency – against organizations connected to settlements or support for the Israel Defence Forces.

The implications of this are enormous and deeply irresponsible.

Once the federal government begins investigating or penalizing charities because of their connections to Israel, it becomes very difficult to draw clear boundaries. In practice, the distinction between

part of Jewish history and identity? What about Jewish summer camps, daycare centres, seniors' homes, healthcare institutions, or community organizations that partner with Israeli charities or employ Israelis who once served in the IDF – as most Israeli adults have?

At a time of rising antisemitism in Canada, many Jewish Canadians will understandably see this not as a narrowly tailored foreign-policy proposal, but as a direct threat to the legitimacy and security of their communal institutions.

The deeper problem, however, is that the letter fundamentally misrepresents the history of the conflict it claims to address.

The signatories insist their recommendations are necessary to preserve a two-state solution. But it is not Israel that has repeatedly rejected two-state proposals. Over decades, Israeli governments accepted or offered frameworks involving land for peace, only to see them rejected by Palestinian leadership unwilling or unable to accept the permanence and legitimacy of a Jewish state.

This is not ancient history. It is one of the central political realities of the conflict.

Repeated Palestinian rejectionism, coupled with repeated waves of terrorism and violence launched from territories transferred or controlled by Palestinians, has profoundly eroded Israeli public confidence in the viability of a two-state solution. The lesson many Israelis drew from Gaza after disengagement was not "land for peace," but "land for rockets."

That reality cannot simply be wished away through diplomatic declarations issued safely from Ottawa.

Nor can the broader regional reality be ignored. Israel is engaged in a multi-front struggle against an Iranian regime that openly calls for its destruction while financing, arming, and directing proxy forces across the region. No responsible Israeli government – left, centre, or right – can realistically be expected to support the rapid creation of a sovereign Palestinian state that could become yet another forward operating base for Iranian-backed militancy on Israel's borders.

Yet the letter barely grapples with any of this.

Instead, it substitutes moral denunciation for strategic thinking.

It is also difficult to ignore the selectivity of the outrage. This is now the second intervention by this self-appointed group on Israel, yet there is little public evidence of comparable campaigns directed at Sudan's mass atrocities, Iran's brutality against women and civilians, Russia's devastation of Ukraine, the millions killed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or China's repression of Uyghurs.

Apparently, only one conflict consistently inspires this level of organized diplomatic activism.

People are entitled to notice that inconsistency.

The greatest weakness of the letter is that it mistakes pressure for peace-making. Sanctions, diplomatic isolation, legal escalation, and symbolic declarations may generate applause in elite political circles, but they do not create the conditions for coexistence. They do not weaken extremists. They do not build trust. And they do not prepare either side for the compromises necessary for any durable settlement.

If these former officials truly wished to contribute constructively, they would focus on strengthening moderate Palestinian governance, promoting regional normalization, confronting Iranian destabilization, encouraging economic development, and supporting educational reform that teaches coexistence rather than hatred.

Instead, they have produced a letter heavy on condemnation, light on balance, and blind to the consequences of the policies they advocate — both for Israel and for Canada's own Jewish community.

Canada needs realism, consistency, and moral clarity rooted in facts rather than fashionable outrage. The May 14 letter offers none of those things. (Macdonald-Laurier Institute May 26)

Mockery is Now Worse Than Murder By Nachum Kaplan

The West has developed a moral vision so grotesquely malformed that it now reacts more strongly to mockery than to mass homicidal ideology. That is the real outrage behind the vehement criticism directed at Israel's Far Right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Ben-Gvir ridiculed anti-Israel flotilla activists that Israel intercepted at sea, and this triggered predictable convulsions among Western diplomats, journalists, NGOs, and the broader managerial priesthood of professional mourners. His comments were declared cruel, inflammatory, provocative, unbecoming, destabilizing, and presumably responsible for climate change.

It was an ugly display, and I have no time for the thuggish Ben-Gvir - except that his analysis of national security is often correct - yet it is simply deranged that Ben-Gvir being obnoxious provokes more outrage than the two million Hamas supporters in Gaza who call for the genocide of Jews.

In what moral universe does that make sense?

This amorality is so glaring that even Palestinian Arab polling data admits it before Western governments avert their eyes like nervous adulterers spotted leaving a brothel. The disparity is dishonest, pathological, and intellectually degrading.

One Israeli politician says something rude about activists sailing toward a war zone to perform moral theater for Western cameras, and the diplomatic class collapses onto its fainting couch in horror. Meanwhile, entire generations of Palestinian Arabs are raised to loathe Jews and hold eliminationist hatred toward them.

Then we are told we must "understand the context." The context apparently matters only when Jews are the target.

When Israelis express anger, resentment, suspicion, tribal defensiveness, or contempt after decades of terrorism, rocket attacks, massacres, hostage-taking, stabbings, shootings, suicide bombings, and openly declared genocidal ambitions, the West demands emotional perfection from them. Israelis are expected to react to existential threats with the emotional regulation of a Buddhist monk floating in a sensory deprivation tank.

Palestinian Arabs, meanwhile, are treated like permanent moral juveniles. Their hatred is endlessly contextualized, sociologized, psychologized, historicized, and aestheticized until exterminationist ideology becomes a form of indigenous self-expression.

The modern Western mind has become incapable of distinguishing between offensive language and civilizational pathology. That distinction matters. A great many people in Gaza do not just oppose Israeli policies, dislike settlements, and hate the military operations, they oppose a Jewish state's existence under any borders whatsoever.

This is not something they hide. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad state it openly, and the Palestinian Authority believes the same thing while maintaining the diplomatic nous to lie about it in English. Clerics state it openly. Television programming has stated it openly for years. Polling repeatedly demonstrates support for October 7-style atrocities at levels that would produce mass panic if observed anywhere else.

Imagine if two million Germans in a neighboring enclave supported massacring French civilians while educational institutions glorified the killers and children's television celebrated exterminationist fantasies. Europe would not react by sending flotillas and lecturing France about proportionality.

Yet when Jews are involved, the West suddenly develops the pattern-recognition abilities of a heavily sedated wombat.

The obsession with Ben-Gvir's rhetoric reveals something deeper and uglier about Western psychology. It is not hatred that disturbs the West. It is Jewish retaliation, anger, tribal consciousness, and Jews refusal to remain morally decorative victims.

Ben-Gvir understands this and engages in these vulgar stunts precisely because they provoke this kind of reaction, which his supporters adore. Ben-Gvir's critics do not seem bright enough to grasp that they are doing his bidding for him. This is why one Israeli politician's vulgarity receives more scrutiny than an entire polity

steeped in Palestinian Arab eliminationism.

The Jew is allowed to suffer, or even die, and to make solemn speeches at Holocaust memorials delivered by European leaders whose grandparents were hiding behind curtains whenever moral courage was required.

What the Jew is not permitted to become is emotionally unconstrained. That terrifies the West to its bones marrows.

The ideal Jew in the Western imagination is dead, endangered, apologetic, displaced, intellectualized, or symbolic. The living Jew with military power, territorial instincts, historical memory, and ethnic solidarity produces acute psychological discomfort in the Western minds.

Ben-Gvir infuriates these people not because he is uniquely offensive. Western politics is overflowing with vulgar narcissists, demagogues, and performative populists. Europe itself manufactures them in industrial quantities. America exports them like soybeans.

No. Ben-Gvir's deeper offense is that he represents Jewish defiance stripped of the submissive etiquette the West prefers. One may disagree with his style, rhetoric, or politics, but the scale of outrage directed toward him compared to the near-indifference shown toward genocidal antisemitism in Gaza exposes a civilization suffering from an advanced moral inversion bordering on cultural dementia.

Western governments know perfectly well Hamas' evil nature. They know what large segments of Palestinian Arab society believe, and that October 7 was not some mysterious "cycle of violence" that emerged spontaneously from the atmosphere like seasonal humidity.

They saw civilians cheering as mutilated Jewish bodies were paraded through Gazan streets. They saw children raised inside a culture where murdering Jews is framed as heroic transcendence rather than moral depravity.

Yet still they obsess over flotilla activists being mocked. It is difficult to overstate how wicked and decadent this is.

Civilizations nearing exhaustion often lose the ability to prioritize threats correctly. They begin confusing symbols for realities. Tone becomes more important than substance, manners more important than survival, and emotional aesthetics more important than truth.

That is where much of the West now finds itself.

Western elites inhabit environments so insulated from existential danger that they interpret harsh rhetoric as more alarming than annihilationist ideology. They react to poor-taste sarcasm as though violence was an unfortunate sociological phenomenon requiring another symposium, another NGO white paper, and another panel discussion moderated by someone with the moral seriousness of a decorative houseplant.

The result is moral illiteracy on a civilizational scale.

Yet no serious international effort exists to deradicalize Palestinian Arab society at scale. Very little pressure is exerted on the educational, religious, media, and political systems that normalize antisemitic hatred. The world spends more energy condemning Israeli zoning permits than confronting cultures that openly celebrate the murder of Jews.

Even now, after October 7 shattered every remaining illusion about Hamas and the ideological ecosystem surrounding it, much of the West still behaves as though Israeli anger is the central pathology requiring urgent management.

The West is in the grip of moral senility.

The flotilla activists themselves embody this pathology perfectly. They sail toward a territory governed by Islamist fanatics whose rulers massacre civilians, oppress dissent, brutalize women, persecute homosexuals, and call for genocide. Yet somehow the emotional focus always returns to Israeli responses.

One suspects that if Israel's enemies announced tomorrow that they intended to murder every Jew between the river and the sea - which many effectively announce every second Tuesday before lunch - Western diplomats would respond with another symposium on "de-escalatory language" while condemning Israelis for insufficient sensitivity toward the emotional needs of aspiring mass murderers.

The sickness runs that deep.

There is something profoundly diseased about a civilization that devotes more outrage to an Israeli politician mocking activists than to mass social hatred directed toward Jews across an entire political culture.

Only a moral pauper could conflate a sneer with slaughter.

The West increasingly does exactly that.

(IsraelNationalNews.com May 24)

Anti-Zionism as a Replacement Theory By Yisrael Medad

Jewish American Heritage Month was celebrated by New York City's Mayor Zohran Mamdani at a reception he hosted, with food supervised by Tarnopol Kashrus services, at Gracie Mansion on May 18. There were speeches galore. The mayor took advantage of the event to announce that he will be adding \$26 million in funding to prevent hate crimes to his proposed 2027 fiscal year budget.

Of course, many believe that if Mamdani had come out more strongly against anti-Jewish groups these past few months, such as those threatening and demonstrating outside synagogues, as well as reduced his unrepentant anti-Israel statements and sentiments (including a no-show at the Israel Day Parade), perhaps much of the sum he is now allotting might not have to be expended at all.

Mostly boycotted by major Jewish organizations, the reception included the anti-Zionist Jewish Voice for Peace and Jews for Racial and Economic Justice; the progressive New Jewish Agenda; and Rabbi Moishe Indig, a leader in the Satmar Chassidic community. Bend the Arc, the social-justice activist group represented by its CEO Jamie Beran, among others, was a co-sponsor of the event.

The progressive Rabbi Abbey Chava Stein was there, too. Another rabbi, David Niederman, executive director of United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburg, shared a belly laugh with the mayor.

The drink selection was limited to Herzog wine from California (nothing from the Shiloh or Psagot wineries).

In related news, a Jewish Heritage reception held by New York Gov. Kathy Hochul was also heavily populated by non-Zionists.

In a post on X, Stein translated an observation from Der Blatt, the widely read Yiddish weekly news sheet of the Rav Aharon (not Rav Zevulun) Satmar branch, that read: "Zionist organizations and their followers throw childish 'tantrum' seeing that their dream to paint Mamdani as antisemitic falls apart" and "Mayor Mamdani promises the leading New York Jewish activists to continue his support of the 'heimish' [aka, ultra-Orthodox] community."

I don't know if J Street was invited or participated. That organization did, however, achieve headline status after Yechiel Leiter, Israel's ambassador to the United States, spoke of its activities during a National Task Force to Combat Antisemitism gathering at the Museum of the Bible in Washington, D.C., just one day later on May 19.

Referring to its advocacy for an arms embargo to Israel, Leiter bluntly stated: "The worst thing about J Street is it's duplicitous. How can you be pro-Israel and advocate for an arms embargo on a state that's fighting a seven-front war against Iranian proxies?"

But what drew attention was his next line: "They are like a cancer in the heart of the Jewish community."

What we are witnessing in this recent alignment of political forces is the formation of—or better, the attempt at—a new Jewish establishment. The interrelations, mutual assistance (for example, the catering came from a Satmar-supervised provider), reciprocal promotions and collaborative support lead to a synergistic effect of empowerment.

Moreover, the Jewish groups and individual Jews engaged in this effort—in the works for some two decades now—are being abetted in their new status reinforcement by forces that are essentially inimical to Jewish communal existence, in general, and fundamental principles of Jewish life, in particular.

The Democratic Socialists are openly hostile to Israel, as even the American Jewish Committee knows. The Satmar Chassidic sect in

Kiryas Joel in Upstate New York and the Williamsburg neighborhood in Brooklyn, N.Y., remains staunchly anti-Zionist. The progressive Jewish groups are, too.

Another factor to take into account is that, after 50 years of championing by most of the Jewish establishment that Israel needs to yield up Judea and Samaria to maintain a Jewish majority and democratic character, American Jewry has a demographic problem of its own.

As Haaretz published, American Jewry's segments with economic and financial power, and political and cultural influence, are in a "demographic decline." The overall Jewish birthrate of 1.5 children per adult indicates a replacement-rate inability. The exception of 3.3 on average for the Orthodox is a bit more upbeat. There's an even higher rate for the Chassidic community, though some sects stand against the formation of the modern-day State of Israel and remain ambivalent on the subject of Zionism, similar to how they felt on the eve of the Holocaust.

Adding to all that intermarriage and conversion to other faiths, what American Jews face is a distinct demographic decline for the non-Orthodox. I need to point out that even many of those remaining Jews who claim to be Jewish do so out of their liberal and cultural politics—not through their religious identity, observance level and or knowledge about their heritage.

Bundists, Communists and anti-Zionist rabbis doomed European Jewry to mass slaughter prior to 1939. What they intend upon doing now is to undercut traditional Jewish communal structures and power. Their anti-Zionism is a replacement-theory charade, substituting a much-distilled Judaism that lacks its national identity character and bolsters a collapse of the Jewish communal framework.

Their danger is real. (JNS May 28)

Are Washington's Most Important Gulf Allies on a Collision Course? By Hussein Aboubakr Mansour

Today, a consequential fault line in the Middle East runs not just between Riyadh and Tehran but between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi — two capitals that share a region, a border, and a security patron, but little else in terms of strategic vision. Understanding this rivalry is no longer optional for serious American statecraft. It is a geopolitical condition that Washington will likely be navigating for years to come.

The two states have been drifting apart for years, but fractures have now surfaced across every major regional issue.

The Saudi-Emirati rivalry, which exploded into public view last December, is characterized by a deep divergence over what a post-American, or at least less American, Middle East should look like, who should lead it, and on what terms. The two states have been drifting apart for years, but fractures have now surfaced across every major regional issue: Yemen, the Horn of Africa, energy markets, relations with Israel, and the competition for economic dominance through diversification.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia and the UAE entered Yemen's civil war as partners in a coalition against the Houthis. They left it, for all practical purposes, as rivals. The UAE backed the Southern Transitional Council, a separatist group that opposed the Saudi-supported goal of restoring Yemen's internationally recognized government in Sanaa. The result was a war within a war, in which forces trained and armed by the UAE occasionally clashed with Saudi-backed units. The truce frameworks that followed never fully resolved the underlying question: Whose Yemen is it?

Across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been projecting power and competing for port access, the right to establish military bases, and political influence in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The stakes are high. Control of Red Sea choke points and Horn of Africa logistics corridors is central to both countries' long-term security strategies. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are not coordinating; they are racing for dominance.

Energy policy has become another area of strategic competition. The UAE's departure earlier this month from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) — which it joined to help regulate the international oil market — made that clear. Abu Dhabi's decision was overdetermined: frustration with production quotas, confidence in its own production capacity, and a desire for strategic autonomy contributed to it. But at its core, it was a rejection of Saudi Arabia's domination of OPEC. Riyadh, which has staked its Vision 2030 project on the assumption that it can manage global oil prices through cartel discipline, correctly interpreted the decision as a direct challenge. The two countries are now, in effect, energy competitors with fundamentally different market strategies.

The UAE bet early on integration with Israel as a pillar of its security architecture, while Saudi Arabia is building a security framework that does not require Israel.

The countries diverge most significantly over Israel. The UAE signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 and has steadily deepened its economic and security ties with Jerusalem. During the war with Iran, the relationship has crossed a threshold that would have been unthinkable even a year ago: Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery and military personnel to operate it on Emirati soil. This was the first time the system had ever been used outside Israel or the United States, and the first confirmed deployment of Israeli troops to an Arab Gulf state. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has conditioned normalization with Israel on concessions from Jerusalem and the United States that have so far proved undeliverable, instead investing its diplomatic energy in building a trilateral defense framework with Turkey and Pakistan. The UAE bet early on integration with Israel as a pillar of its security architecture, while Saudi Arabia is building a security framework that does not require Israel.

None of this means that the two countries are enemies. They share vital security interests, particularly regarding Iran, despite their radically divergent visions. They cooperate on counterterrorism. Their economies are intertwined. Saudi nationals are among the UAE's largest sources of investment and tourism. But strategic rivalry and economic interdependence often coexist — just ask France and Germany — and the rivalry will define the policy challenges Washington faces in the Gulf.

American policymakers will be tempted to pick a side, but they should resist. The United States has deep and important interests in both countries, such as security cooperation, energy stability, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and the regional balance of power. Choosing between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi would be strategically mistaken and practically impossible. Both relationships are essential to American foreign policy.

If we get the Iran endgame wrong, managing the Saudi-UAE rivalry will become an exercise in diminishing returns.

But that does not mean we can afford to ignore the matter. The Saudi-UAE rivalry will not be resolved by a summit or a phone call. It will shape the internal dynamics of every multilateral framework in the region, from the Gulf Cooperation Council to OPEC+ to the Abraham Accords themselves. Above all, American policymakers must recognize that the future of both relationships, and Washington's leverage within each, rests on how the war with Iran concludes.

The post-Iran regional order will determine how Riyadh and Abu Dhabi compete, cooperate, and calculate their respective needs for American partnership. If we get the Iran endgame wrong, managing the Saudi-UAE rivalry will become an exercise in diminishing returns. If we get it right, the United States will retain the strategic position to shape a Gulf that works with American interests rather than around them. The first step toward a serious Gulf policy is admitting that our two most important Arab partners are playing very different games — and that managing the distance between them may be a defining feature of American strategy in the Middle East for the foreseeable future. (National Review May 24)

Strike Beirut to Stop Hezbollah's Drone Threat

By Meir Ben Shabbat

To deal with Hezbollah's drone threat, Beirut must be brought into the equation. That is what we have repeatedly stressed recently, here in Israel Hayom as well.

At the heart of the matter is the understanding that defensive measures, and even offensive efforts against every component of Hezbollah's value chain related to drone weapons, will not be enough to prevent their use against us. The availability of this weapon, its low cost and its simple and safe operation will preserve the motivation to use it and will make it difficult for our forces to chase down and eradicate every last drone.

Effectively confronting this threat depends on the ability to make Hezbollah question whether using it against the Israel Defense Forces is worthwhile. That can be achieved only through strikes and the toppling of buildings in Beirut.

According to media reports, at a meeting of the limited cabinet held last night, Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir and government ministers supported this approach and recommended striking Beirut in response to explosive drone attacks.

Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the drone attacks have continued unabated since then, Israel has so far refrained from striking the Lebanese capital. Instead, the internet is filled with stories about private initiatives to purchase fishing nets and other means of improving protection for our forces.

The current restriction on fire, in accordance with the American demand, provides Hezbollah with defensive space and prevents Israel from using its aerial superiority against it. In doing so, it also assists the terrorist organization in its efforts to restore the response equations that prevailed before November 2024.

Without detracting from the importance of defensive components, techno-tactical tools and the effort to locate and destroy production facilities, warehouses and drone operators, the effective path to dealing with this threat runs through Beirut.

To make Hezbollah question the wisdom of using these means, a price must be exacted from it that it cannot tolerate. That can be achieved only by striking targets in Dahiyeh, Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut.

Not only targeted operations and eliminations, but the collapse of buildings and the sowing of destruction in the center of gravity, and the political, military and social symbol, of the Shiite terrorist organization in the Lebanese capital.

After Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem made clear in his speech that he had no intention of disarming, defied the Lebanese government and heaped praise on Iran, there is no reason to leave its strongholds in Dahiyeh and the Beqaa Valley standing.

Increasing the pressure on Hezbollah will also serve the American desire to reach an agreement with Iran, which at the moment has no reason to be worried about the condition of its Lebanese proxy.

"The era in which a terrorist organization holds a nation hostage is nearing its end," US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in response to Naim Qassem's speech. Strikes in Beirut would give that declaration more force than any tweet or diplomatic statement.

As for the implications for diplomatic talks between Israel and Lebanon, it should be assumed that Israeli strikes in Beirut would make it difficult for General Aoun to continue moving along the diplomatic track with Israel, at least in the short term.

However, they would give legitimacy to his demands of Hezbollah, and at more advanced stages he could be the one to bring the news of a ceasefire and the rescue of Beirut, instead of Iran, which is currently receiving the credit for it.

Either way, Israel must preserve its freedom of action to defend itself, and that includes strikes in Beirut intended to prevent UAV and drone attacks on the northern border. (Israel Hayom May 25)