



ISRAEL NEWS
A collection of the week's news from Israel
From the Bet El Twinning / Israel Action Committee of
Beth Avraham Yoseph of Toronto Congregation

warfare are not separate files in Tehran's strategic cabinet; they are integrated instruments of power. The International Atomic Energy Agency's November board report on Iran's safeguards obligations provides

Commentary...

The Axis of Instability: Iran, Proxy Warfare and the Fragmenting Middle East By Yuval David

The Middle East is not moving toward resolution; it is reorganizing around instability. The defining force shaping the region today is no longer conventional interstate war, but a layered system of proxy warfare, asymmetric confrontation and strategic ambiguity led primarily by the Islamic Republic of Iran. What is emerging is not chaos but a deliberate architecture of destabilization—an axis of instability—designed to erode sovereignty, weaken state systems and challenge Western influence without triggering full-scale war.

The U.S. Intelligence Community's unclassified 2025 threat assessment describes Iran as a state that advances its interests through asymmetric means and partners, a posture that continues to shape the region's strategic volatility.

Iran's doctrine is calibrated confrontation. Rather than seek conventional victory in direct interstate war, Tehran projects power through a constellation of non-state actors and aligned militias operating across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the Palestinian arena. That system is not an abstraction. It is operationalized as a networked campaign, designed to stretch adversaries across multiple fronts while shielding Iran's leadership from the full costs of overt escalation. The point is not merely to threaten; it is to degrade sovereignty, to hollow out institutions and to normalize the idea that states no longer monopolize force within their own borders.

Congress's most recent public overview of Iranian-backed groups underscores the breadth of these arenas—from Gaza, to Hezbollah-Israel escalation, to Houthi attacks on international shipping—capturing how a "surge" in such attacks has reshaped the regional security environment since October 2023.

Lebanon illustrates the structural consequences of proxy entrenchment. Hezbollah is not simply a militant organization that happens to wield political influence; it is a parallel military authority with strategic alignment to Tehran and the capacity to pull Lebanon into regional war irrespective of Lebanon's national interest. That is the central pathology of the proxy model: It converts a sovereign state into a platform. It turns national territory into a forward operating base, while political institutions become bargaining chips in a regional chess match. When governance collapses under this burden, Iran does not lose leverage; it gains it because weakness becomes dependency, and dependency becomes control.

In the maritime domain, the proxy strategy becomes even more revealing. Iran and its partners do not merely contest borders and buffer zones; they contest arteries—sea lanes, trade corridors and chokepoints that keep economies moving. Here, deterrence is no longer confined to air defense or armored divisions. It becomes a struggle over freedom of navigation, commercial risk and the global price of instability.

In late January, U.S. Central Command issued a formal statement warning Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to avoid unsafe behavior in the Strait of Hormuz, emphasizing CENTCOM's readiness to ensure the safety of U.S. personnel and commercial maritime traffic. That warning is not a routine press note, but represents recognition that Iran's escalation toolkit increasingly targets the seams of the international system—where global commerce and regional militarization collide.

At the center of this evolving order remains the unresolved question of Iran's nuclear ambitions. The argument that nuclear diplomacy can be siloed from Iran's regional warfare is increasingly difficult to defend. Nuclear capability, missile capacity and proxy

a granular window into the international community's continuing concerns, as well as the agency's findings and documentation under the NPT safeguards framework. Even when diplomacy advances in narrow channels, Iran's regional model persists—because the proxy network is not just leverage for negotiations. It is the method by which Tehran sustains its regional posture regardless of negotiations.

Israel's own diplomatic and security messaging has been explicit about the convergence of these threats. In a statement in September issued through Israel's diplomatic mission, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed Israel's strategic objectives in Gaza in terms of dismantling Hamas's military and governing capacity so Gaza "never again poses a threat," reflecting an Israeli view that the region cannot stabilize while Iranian-backed armed governance structures remain intact.

Israel's wider argument, consistently expressed across official channels, is that the threat matrix is integrated: nuclear ambition, missile buildup and proxy militarization function together.

Arab states, too, are articulating sovereign interests that collide directly with Iran's posture. These statements matter because they rebut the fashionable fiction that regional concerns about Iran are merely Israeli or American narratives. The Gulf Cooperation Council's final communiqué in December condemned Iranian escalatory actions and hostile measures, particularly regarding three islands (Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs) associated with the United Arab Emirates, explicitly framing Iran's behavior as inconsistent with de-escalation and confidence-building and calling for constructive positions under international law. The UAE has reinforced the same position in early 2026, stating that Iran's occupation of its three islands constitutes a violation of sovereignty and the U.N. Charter, in a formal joint statement with the African Union Commission.

This is not rhetorical flourish but the language of states explaining, in diplomatic text, that Iran's model corrodes sovereignty and threatens regional order.

What distinguishes the present moment is not merely the persistence of conflict but the normalization of instability as a governing condition. The Middle East is increasingly shaped by a continuous spectrum of confrontation—proxy warfare, maritime coercion, strategic intimidation and ideological mobilization—rather than episodic wars. Sovereignty becomes porous; alliances become transactional; deterrence becomes harder because adversaries operate below the threshold that triggers a decisive response. In that environment, the axis of instability is not a temporary crisis; it is a strategic system.

The policy implication is straightforward, even if the implementation is not. If the region is reorganizing around instability, then stability cannot be pursued as a talking point or a summit photo. It must be pursued as a strategy that treats proxy warfare as the central instrument of Iran's regional power—and responds accordingly.

That means insisting on sovereignty as a hard security principle, not a diplomatic cliché. It means defending navigation corridors as national security interests, not merely commercial conveniences. And it means treating nuclear diplomacy as necessary but insufficient because Iran's destabilization model does not begin at enrichment levels but with the steady conversion of weak states into platforms for non-state war.

The axis of instability is not inevitable, but it is resilient. It thrives in fractured states, unresolved conflicts and geopolitical ambiguity. Until policymakers confront this reality with clarity, coordination and strategic consistency, the Middle East will remain

suspended not between war and peace, but within a persistent condition of engineered instability—an order shaped not by resolution but by deliberate disorder. (JNS Feb 19)

When is the Best Time to Visit Israel? Right Now

By Rabbi Jonathan Pearl

For many who are motivated to travel to the State of Israel, going there often seems to depend on timing and safety concerns. The fear factor weighs heavily, as do political and religious proclivities. But if traveling there to visit family and friends, to tour the land and the sites, and to reconnect and re-energize Jewishly, these welcome and precious purposes, among others, should transcend other considerations.

The question comes down to: When should I go? I believe the time to go is now, always now.

My motivation for scheduling a recent trip was the same as it was the previous two times I went after the Hamas-led terrorist attacks in the southern part of the country on Oct. 7, 2023. It was a cataclysmic Islamist invasion and pogrom against Israel and the Jewish people. I went then solely to express loving and wholehearted support for the people of Israel—the soldiers, the bereaved families, the hostage families, the various other defenders and leaders of the land and people, and the all-encompassing community of all its faithful citizens.

I embarked on this third visit, a six-day solo solidarity mission, with overwhelming Zionist passion and a clear purpose—with no prearranged schedule or tapping any insider connections.

I set out to visit recuperating and rehabilitating soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces who were wounded over the course of Israel's two-year war with Hamas in Gaza and on other fronts. I went to three hospitals: the Mount Scopus branch of Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem; the Shamir Medical Center (formerly Assaf Harofeh Medical Center) in Be'er Ya'akov; and Ichilov Hospital, Tel Aviv Sourasky Medical Center.

At one of these, a nurse told me that she had good news and bad news for me. The bad news? She had no one for me to visit. The good news? She had no one for me to visit!

Of course, this was wonderful to hear, as fewer wounded are coming in. Many have healed and been discharged, and others are being treated on an outpatient basis. In the other two hospitals, there were still some patients.

I was told that while in the earlier stages of the war, visits from the public were constant, over time they have slowed. As such, there was tremendous appreciation (with hugs and tears) for the time spent with individual soldiers.

Injuries ranged in type and severity; however, the indomitable spirit emanating from these patients was nothing less than inspiring. For each person I visited, I said a blessing and gave a hand-drawn card written by the children of our congregation. Although patients, families and staff thanked me, I responded: "You are the heroes."

And I asked them to accept our profound and eternal gratitude, as each of them is a *gibor Yisrael*, a "hero of Israel" and the Israeli people. What an honor it was to speak with them.

I also had the good fortune to meet with Tzvika Mor, the father of former hostage Eitan Mor, a 23-year-old security guard working at the Nova music festival on Oct. 7, who saved many lives before being kidnapped by Palestinian terrorists and dragged into Gaza. Eitan, who survived two years in horrific captivity, was in the very last group of 20 living hostages returned to Israel this past October. His father is chairman of the Tikva ("Hope") Forum. He spent countless hours and endless energy during his son's ordeal supporting Israel's achieving total victory over Hamas as the best way to quickly and definitively end the horror inflicted upon Israel and the Jewish people, and to get all the hostages home.

I was also privileged to meet with bereaved family member Rabbi Yehoshua Shani, the father of IDF Capt. Ori Shani, who fell in battle on Oct. 7.

Ori, a 22-year-old platoon commander in the Golani Brigade, was at the Kissufim military outpost and succeeded in saving many

innocent lives while eliminating many invading terrorists before he was killed on that dark day. His father is chairman of the HaGevura ("Heroism") Forum, an organization of bereaved families who want to see Israel in total victory over Hamas, thus honoring their loved ones' ultimate sacrifice, and fulfilling their loved ones' mission and vision.

Interspersed with these activities, I spent the little remaining time in synagogues, at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, at cemeteries, and visiting with Israeli family and friends, which put me in touch with the rhythms, circumstances, feelings and visions animating society during these challenging times. Also, with one of Israel's superb tour guides, I had the merit of drawing nourishment from our historic roots on a special individualized tour of the newly opened Pilgrimage Road, the very stones of which Jews used to ascend to the Beit Hamikdash ("Holy Temple") in Jerusalem more than 2,000 years ago.

In addition, timed to the Jewish calendar and land, I visited one of the oldest and largest trees in Israel—the famous sycamore in Netanya—in anticipation of the upcoming holiday of Tu B'Shevat.

To an unusual extent, this past trip, I was overcome with a sense of belonging. As antisemitism rages through the United States and the world, it felt fulfilling to be in the land that God gave to the Jewish people as an inheritance. It felt safe. It felt good to be home.

So, when is the best time to travel to Israel? Now!

Now is the time to visit our people—to support them, love them, be inspired by them. And, in the process, to simultaneously re-energize your own Jewish Zionist bona fides. (JNS Feb 15)

When Populism Beats Policy

By Charles Jacobs and Irwin J. Mansdorf

Democratic elections often produce a familiar paradox: Candidates with extreme positions on certain issues can still win broad support because voters connect more strongly with a different, emotionally resonant message. Americans have grown accustomed to seeing this dynamic on the political left, where themes such as affordability or social justice can outweigh a candidate's hostility toward Israel. A more unsettling question now emerges on the right: Can the same mechanism allow candidates or public figures with troubling views on Israel or Jews to gain traction among Republicans?

Our recent survey of 561 Republicans—balanced by age and gender, and conducted on Jan. 21-22, with a margin of error of plus or minus 4%—sought to explore precisely this tension.

We used the popularity of former Fox News host and current political commentator Tucker Carlson as an indicator of broader Republican sentiment. He is a useful case study because he has shifted from being a mainstream conservative media figure to a polarizing personality who is widely perceived as unsupportive of Israel and, by many observers, as promoting or tolerating antisemitic narratives. Yet despite this, he remains highly popular within the Republican electorate.

The first major finding is a clear generational divide. Across the entire sample, we found more than 45% of respondents believed that Carlson is likely to run for national office, and more than 48% said they would vote for him if he did.

Among Republicans under the age of 44, support was substantially higher: More than 55% saw him as a likely candidate, and more than 58% said they would probably vote for him. Among Republicans aged 45 and older, enthusiasm dropped sharply, with only 38% believing that he would run, and 41% expressing willingness to vote for him.

Carlson's potential political appeal, in short, is significantly stronger among younger Republicans. Ours is not an "outlier" finding, as other data, especially a recent study from the Manhattan Institute think tank, show similar results.

At first glance, these numbers might be interpreted as evidence of growing anti-Israel or anti-Jewish sentiment within the Republican base. Our data suggests a more complex or nuanced reality. Perhaps

counterintuitively, support for Carlson does not automatically translate into hostility toward Israel or Jews. Both age cohorts continue to show substantial support for Israel and generally positive views of Jews, although younger Republicans are consistently less supportive than their older counterparts.

When asked about the importance of various foreign-policy issues, younger Republicans rated support for Israel as “very important” or “extremely important” at a rate of 55%, compared with 69% among those aged 45 and above. This gap is meaningful, but it does not indicate outright opposition. Rather, for younger Republicans, the State of Israel appears to occupy a similar priority level as other foreign-policy issues, rather than standing out as uniquely significant. This suggests a broader generational shift in how international commitments are ranked, not necessarily a singular rejection of Israel.

The more troubling signal emerges when respondents were asked whether certain groups pose a threat to the “American way of life.” On immigrants and Muslims, age differences were modest, with majorities in both cohorts expressing at least moderate concern.

On Jews, however, the generational gap was pronounced. Some 45% of Republicans under 44 expressed elevated concern, compared with 23% among those 45 and older. Even though Jews were still viewed as less threatening than other groups, the fact that nearly half of younger Republicans expressed this level of concern should not be dismissed lightly. It points to a growing susceptibility to narratives that frame Jews as a societal problem, even among voters who do not consider themselves antisemitic.

How can these findings be reconciled? How can substantial support for Israel coexist with a strong willingness to back a figure associated with anti-Israel rhetoric?

The answer lies in political psychology.

Voters frequently prioritize a candidate’s overarching message, tone or identity over specific policy positions. Well-documented mechanisms such as motivated reasoning, the halo effect and affect-based heuristics allow individuals to focus on what they like about a candidate, while minimizing or rationalizing aspects that they find troubling. For some people, their “halo” glows brightly enough to blind observers from any negatives. Israel becomes unimportant and even irrelevant to political decision-making, especially for younger Americans.

This is the core warning of our study. The principal risk to Israel and to Jewish communities may not be an immediate collapse of Republican support; rather, it is the gradual erosion of Israel’s role as a politically decisive issue.

If Israel becomes a non-disqualifying concern, something voters are willing to overlook, then candidates with hostile or extreme positions can advance without paying a political price. We have seen this dynamic elsewhere, where once-disqualifying views fade into the background amid louder populist appeals (witness the “affordability” campaign of New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani).

For Israel and for American Jewish communities, the implication is clear. It is no longer sufficient to ask whether “most Republicans support Israel” in the abstract. The more important question is whether that support is strong enough to influence voter behavior when faced with a charismatic populist who offers a trade-off: cultural combat at home in exchange for indifference or hostility toward Israel.

Our findings also suggest a strategic lesson. Research shows that appealing but flawed candidates can lose their aura when a single negative trait is clearly and repeatedly highlighted, a phenomenon known as the “horn effect.” This does not mean reckless attacks or caricature. It means honest, focused and consistent scrutiny that exposes the real consequences of a candidate’s views. Those who care about the future of the U.S.-Israel relationship may need to confront popular figures early and directly before favorable impressions harden.

Yet there is good news in our data. Republican support for Israel has not collapsed, and younger Republicans are not uniformly anti-Israel or anti-Jewish.

And, of course, there is bad news. The psychological machinery that allows voters to ignore troubling positions is already operating, and it appears to be stronger among the rising generation. The critical

question is not whether Israel still matters to Republican voters in principle, but whether it will matter enough when it truly counts.

The task is moving from the halo to the horns. (JNS Feb 19)

Jews Endangering Jews By Yisrael Medad

The press contact person for the group Jews for Racial Equality and Justice released a position statement on Feb. 9 that included the joint agreement of the American Council for Judaism, the Jewish Voice for Peace-New York City and IfNotNow NYC. Sophie Ellman-Golan, “a committed activist working on issues of racial and gender justice, queer liberation and police violence” and “is a proud member of the #JewishResistance,” informed the media that they are urging New York’s City Council to reject “anti-democratic buffer zone bills” that place restrictions on protests in the vicinity of houses of worship.”

Presenting themselves as “Jewish New Yorkers,” they further warn that the “proposed legislation threatens to erode free-speech protections.” They fear for the First Amendment. They specifically referred to Intros 0001 and 0175 proposed by Julie Menin, speaker of the City Council, and council member Eric Dinowitz.

Employing their chutzpah, they explain that it is a “strong, pluralistic democracy” that “creates the best conditions for the safety of all marginalized groups, including Jews.”

To their thinking, protests outside New York City synagogues were hosting “highly controversial and non-religious political events, at least one of which encouraged the illegal sale of Palestinian land, in violation of international law.” Therefore, in hosting “non-religious political events,” they become legitimate targets for demonstrations.

Three things irk me about their presentation.

The first is quite basic. The First Amendment states that: “Congress shall make no law ... abridging freedom of speech.” The freedom these groups is not an unlimited and unrestricted one. As the U.S. courts have made clear, freedom of speech does not include the right to incite imminent lawless action (*Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444 [1969]). In the past two years, multiple demonstrations have occurred at synagogues, and all of them have been threatening, verbally and physically. Imminent injury or worse is a staple of these actions and, thereby, are lawless.

Secondly, the regulations deal with buffer zones. The protests are not banned. They are required to be held at a distance from the institution. I personally do not think that 25 yards should be the line of prohibition; it isn’t enough. At the very least, across the street and 50 yards away should be the “line in the sand.” Bullhorns make enough noise to be heard even from a distance of 100 yards. Signs and banners are visible at that distance. What is at stake is preventing the rushing of people attending such events and harm being caused by providing the police with the needed buffer space.

My third point is that attempting to portray the selling of property in Israel as not bound up with religious obligations of Jews to live in their national homeland is promoting a travesty of Judaism. The Torah and the other books of Tanach make it very clear that these anti-Zionist groups are making a false presentation. Rabbinical writings over the past two millennia also consider dwelling in the Land of Israel a commandment. The Jewishness of these groups rings hollow.

What they are doing is substituting their liberal progressivism for genuine Jewish values. Essentially, it is they who are making religious events fodder for their own politics. Moreover, the results of their shared activities with pro-Palestine Arabs groups and other radical cadres are simply to increase the danger to Jews and the need for those buffer laws.

What should be obvious is that they are consciously and purposefully seeking situations in which what is endangered is not anyone’s freedom of speech, but the right to life and liberty, and the right that property be protected. I am further unhappy with the buffer laws, if only because they can be seen as returning Jews to some sort of a “ghetto”—mentally, psychologically and physically.

The coalition of these antagonistic groups is downtrodden Jews. They prefer that some vague “freedom,” as they seek to define it, would take preference over the very expected danger that Jews will suffer. They don’t aim to protect an exalted liberty of “freedom of speech,” but, rather, to continue generating a hate-filled and false anti-Jewish narrative that must be done through “resistance,” which in leftist circles is a euphemism for violence of some sort.

Yet there is one more point in their opposition to the buffer laws that does not irk me. Eventually, as happened throughout Jewish history, those Jews in the forefront of anti-Jewish policies through their choice of political errors will fall victim to the hate and violence they motivate by lending their support to antisemitism. Ultimately, they, too, will feel the pain and forever be shamed. (JNS Feb 18)

Israel Moves to Clarify and Register Property Ownership in Judea, Samaria

By Josh Hasten

The Israeli government on Sunday approved a proposal to resume the process of land registration in Judea and Samaria for the first time since the 1967 Six-Day War.

The agenda item was introduced to the Cabinet by Justice Minister Yariv Levin, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Defense Minister Israel Katz.

The Regavim movement, an NGO dedicated to the protection of Israel’s national lands, applauded the move.

“Restarting the survey and registration process means Israel will now formally map and record ownership under its current administrative system, without any change to the political status of the territory in question,” said Naomi Kahn, director of Regavim’s International Division.

The move does not constitute “creeping annexation” or a “backdoor declaration of sovereignty,” she said. Rather, it is a technical, administrative step to clarify and register property ownership, with no direct political impact. This is because the Cabinet instructed the Israel Defense Forces, which administers Judea and Samaria, to request that the Justice Ministry register the land claims.

This is essentially the same mechanism Israel has been using since 1967 in applying civil law to Israelis living throughout Judea and Samaria.

In practical terms, Kahn said the ruling will result in clear determination of ownership—for both Arabs and Jews—that will create legally binding property boundaries for individuals and for publicly owned land.

It will not only protect the rights of individual owners, she said, but also the rights of the State of Israel and its citizens.

“Full land registration will prevent illegal annexation of public land, and bring to a close the decades-long era of endless legal challenges to Jewish homes and communities built in good faith and in accordance with the law,” said Kahn.

After the Six-Day War, Israel froze land registration, previously managed by Jordan, citing unreliable records, thus avoiding permanent legal changes in territory it had not formally annexed.

Yesterday’s government decision shows that the mentality in Israel has finally changed, said Kahn.

“This is probably the most important step taken by the Israeli government since June 1967—and the most overdue,” she said. “The most basic requirement for any government—whether it be a caretaker or a fully recognized sovereign—is to establish clear and transparent ownership of land.”

Officially registered land will now acquire permanent legal status, she said.

Therefore, she added, nightmare scenarios in which government-approved neighborhoods were dismantled due to post-facto legal challenges to land ownership will be a thing of the past.

“As every American will tell you, ‘good fences make good neighbors,’” she said. “Clear legal registration will bring stability and normalcy, preclude the weaponization of the legal process that seeks to prevent Jews from returning to their ancestral lands, and will prevent the conflicts that have plagued the region for decades.”

Yisrael Ganz, head of the Binyamin Regional Council and chairman of the Yesha Council, called the decision historic, saying it was one he had been waiting for decades.

The ramifications are clear, he said: “The State of Israel is beginning to register the land in an orderly manner in the Land Registry ... safeguarding its strategic assets, and stopping the Arab takeover on the ground.”

The move delivers historical justice to landowners and will help regulate the State of Israel’s land reserves, he added.

Instead of hidden registries in the Civil Administration, all registrations will be open to the public, as everywhere else in the State of Israel, he noted.

“This move is the most effective response to blocking the Palestinian Authority’s takeover attempts and will put an end to lawlessness: From now on, an Arab claiming ownership of land will have to prove it with evidence, and situations of unsubstantiated ownership claims will no longer be possible,” said Ganz.

The Sovereignty Movement, led by Nadia Matar and Yehudit Katsover, told JNS the decision was a giant step in advancing the full de jure application of sovereignty—which they argued was the ultimate goal, ensuring that Judea, Samaria and Gaza will always be under Israeli law, just like Petach Tikva, Rehovot, or Ra’anana.

Every military victory, including 1967, must be sealed with a sovereign and diplomatic victory, and Israel had delayed this for decades, leaving room for false claims and uncertainty, they said.

“Today, the government is finally correcting that, safeguarding the Land of Israel, and taking us closer to final victory: full, irreversible sovereignty and the prevention of any future Palestinian state,” they added.

In the joint statement announcing the decision, Katz said the move was an essential security and governance measure intended to ensure the State of Israel’s control, enforcement and full freedom of action in the area.

Katz said that regulating land ownership prevents the establishment of unilateral facts on the ground, reduces illegal takeover attempts, and harms terrorist infrastructure that undermines stability and security.

“This is a necessary step to create operational and legal certainty, enabling the IDF and the security establishment to act decisively to defend the citizens of Israel and safeguard national interests,” he said.

Smotrich added that an orderly land settlement prevents disputes, creates legal certainty, prevents unilateral steps, and enables lawful and responsible development.

“The State of Israel is taking responsibility for its land and acting in accordance with the law, with transparency and determination,” he said.

According to Levin, the approved proposal constitutes a genuine revolution in Judea and Samaria.

“The Land of Israel belongs to the People of Israel. The government of Israel is committed to deepening its hold on all parts of it, and this decision is an expression of that commitment,” he said.

Separately on Sunday, for the first time since Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza and northern Samaria, the Israeli Interior Ministry allowed a resident of the reestablished community of Homesh to list “Homesh” as his place of residence on his state-issued ID card.

Homesh recently received an official community “symbol” from the State of Israel, in a process advanced by Smotrich together with Samaria Regional Council head Yossi Dagan.

Dagan, himself expelled from the Samaria community of Sa-Nur, called the recognition another step toward returning home.

He added that under his council’s jurisdiction he would work to prepare the infrastructure for receiving those families seeking to return to Homesh and that the community would be four times larger than it was before the 2005 expulsion.

“Those who sought to uproot Homesh will receive a larger and stronger Homesh, firmly rooted in the ground. We have returned home,” said Dagan. (JNS Feb 18)
